The Favored Minister愛臣
愛臣太親，必危其身；人臣太貴，必易主位；主妾無等，必危嫡子；兄弟不服，必危社稷。臣聞千乘之君無備，必有百乘之臣在其側，以徙其民而傾其國；萬乘之君無備，必有千乘之家在其側，以徙其威而傾其國。是以姦臣蕃息，主道衰亡。是故諸侯之博大，天子之害也；羣臣之太富，君主之敗也。將相之管主而隆家，此君人者所外也。萬物莫如身之至貴也，位之至尊也，主威之重，主勢之隆也。此四美者，不求諸外，不請於人，議之而得之矣。故曰：人主不能用其富，則終於外也。此君人者之所識也。
When a favored minister is too close, the ruler's own body is surely in danger. When a minister is too honored, the ruler's place is surely changed. When the ruler's consorts have no ranks, the son of the principal wife is surely in danger. When brothers do not submit, the altars of soil and grain are surely in danger. Your servant has heard that when a lord of a thousand chariots has made no provision, there will surely be a minister of a hundred chariots at his side to move his people away and overturn his state; and when a lord of ten thousand chariots has made no provision, there will surely be a house of a thousand chariots at his side to move his authority away and overturn his state. For this reason treacherous ministers multiply and the way of the ruler withers and perishes. So the broadness and greatness of the feudal lords is the harm of the Son of Heaven, and the excessive wealth of the host of ministers is the undoing of the lord of men. That generals and chancellors should take the ruler in hand and raise up their own houses is what one who stands above men keeps at a distance. Among the ten thousand things none is so utterly honorable as his own person and none so utterly lofty as his place, and the authority of the ruler is heavy and the power of the ruler is high. These four fine things are not sought outside and not begged of others; they are gained by weighing them for oneself. Therefore it is said that if the ruler cannot use his own wealth, he ends his days outside. This is what one who stands above men should know.
昔者紂之亡，周之卑，皆從諸侯之博大也；晉之分也，齊之奪也，皆以羣臣之太富也。夫燕、宋之所以弑其君者，皆此類也。故上比之殷、周，中比之燕、宋，莫不從此術也。是故明君之蓄其臣也，盡之以法，質之以備。故不赦死，不宥刑，赦死宥刑，是謂威淫。社稷將危，國家偏威。是故大臣之祿雖大，不得藉威城市；黨與雖衆，不得臣士卒。故人臣處國無私朝，居軍無私交，其府庫不得私貸於家。此明君之所以禁其邪。是故不得四從，不載奇兵；非傳非遽，載奇兵革，罪死不赦。此明君之所以備不虞者也。
In ancient times the ruin of Zhou Xin and the lowering of the house of Zhou both came from the broadness and greatness of the feudal lords, and the dividing of Jin and the seizing of Qi both came from the excessive wealth of the host of ministers. The reason the men of Yan and of Song killed their rulers is likewise of this kind. So whether we compare with Yin and Zhou above or with Yan and Song between, there is none that did not follow from this course. Therefore the enlightened ruler, in rearing his ministers, uses the law to the full and holds them in check by his provisions. So he does not pardon a capital crime and does not soften a punishment. To pardon a capital crime and soften a punishment is called letting authority run loose. Then the altars of soil and grain will be in danger and the authority of the state will lean to one side. Therefore, though the emolument of a great minister be large, he may not borrow authority in the walled towns and the markets; and though his followers be many, he may not make the soldiers his own servants. So a minister who is in the state may not hold a court of his own, and when he is with the army he may not make friendships of his own, and he may not lend out the goods of the storehouses to his own house. This is how the enlightened ruler forbids their crookedness. So a minister may not go about with four attendants and may not carry unusual weapons; and if it is not a matter of the post stations and of urgency, and he carries unusual weapons and armor, it is a capital crime and is not pardoned. This is how the enlightened ruler makes provision against what is unlooked for.