Solitary Indignation孤憤
智術之士，必遠見而明察，不明察，不能燭私；能法之士，必强毅而勁直，不勁直，不能矯姦。人臣循令而從事，案法而治官，非謂重人也。重人也者，無令而擅爲，虧法以利私，耗國以便家，力能得其君，此所爲重人也。智術之士明察，聽用，且燭重人之陰情；能法之士勁直，聽用，且矯重人之姦行。故智術能法之士用，則貴重之臣必在繩之外矣。是智法之士與當塗之人，不可兩存之仇也。當塗之人擅事要，則外内爲之用矣。是以諸侯不因，則事不應，故敵國爲之訟；百官不因，則業不進，故羣臣爲之用；郎中不因，則不得近主，故左右爲之匿；學士不因，則養祿薄禮卑，故學士爲之談也。此四助者，邪臣之所以自飾也。重人不能忠主而進其仇，人主不能越四助而燭察其臣，故人主愈弊而大臣愈重。
The man of wisdom and method must see far and look clearly, and if he does not look clearly he cannot light up what is private. The man skilled in law must be firm and upright, and if he is not upright he cannot straighten treachery. A minister who follows orders in his work and governs his office by the law is not called a minister of heavy power (zhongren). A minister of heavy power is one who acts as he pleases without orders, breaks the law to profit himself, drains the state to ease his own house, and has strength enough to get hold of his ruler. This is what is meant by a minister of heavy power. If the man of wisdom and method looks clearly and his words are used, he will light up the hidden designs of the minister of heavy power. If the man skilled in law is upright and his words are used, he will straighten the treacherous deeds of the minister of heavy power. So when the man of wisdom and method and the man skilled in law are used, the honored and heavy minister is sure to fall outside the inked line. This is to say that the man of law and method and the man in the seat of power (dangtu) are enemies who cannot both remain. When the man in the seat of power takes the vital business into his own hands, then those within and those without are put to his use. Thus the feudal lords who do not go through him get no answer to their business, and so enemy states speak for him. The hundred officers who do not go through him make no headway in their work, and so the host of ministers is put to his use. The palace attendants who do not go through him cannot come near the ruler, and so those at his left and right hide things for him. The men of learning who do not go through him are thin in stipend and low in ceremony, and so the men of learning talk for him. These four helps are how a crooked minister dresses himself up. The minister of heavy power cannot be loyal to his ruler and bring forward his own enemy, and the ruler cannot get past these four helps to light up and examine his ministers. So the ruler is curtained off ever more and the great minister grows ever heavier.
凡當塗者之於人主也，希不信愛也，又且習故。若夫即主心，同乎好惡，固其所自進也。官爵貴重，朋黨又衆，而一國爲之訟。則法術之士欲干上者，非有所信愛之親、習故之澤也，又將以法術之言矯人主阿辟之心，是與人主相反也。處勢卑賤，無黨孤特。夫以䟽遠與近愛信爭，其數不勝也；以新旅與習故爭，其數不勝也；以反主意與同好惡爭，其數不勝也；以輕賤與貴重爭，其數不勝也；以一口與一國爭，其數不勝也。法術之士操五不勝之勢，以歲數而又不得見，當塗之人乘五勝之資，而旦暮獨說於前。故法術之士奚道得進，而人主奚時得悟乎？故資必不勝而勢不兩存，法術之士焉得不危？其可以罪過誣者，以公法而誅之；其不可被以罪過者，以私劒而窮之。是明法術而逆主上者，不僇於吏誅，必死於私劒矣。朋黨比周以弊主，言曲以便私者，必信於重人矣。故其可以功伐借者，以官爵貴之；其不可借以美名者，以外權重之。是以弊主上而趨於私門者，不顯於官爵，必重於外權矣。今人主不合參驗而行誅，不待見功而爵祿，故法術之士安能蒙死亡而進其說？姦邪之臣安肯乘利而退其身？故主上愈卑，私門益尊。
Of those who hold the road, few are not trusted and loved by the ruler, and they are old familiars besides. To fall in with the ruler's heart and share his likes and dislikes is the very road by which they came forward. Their office and rank are honored and heavy, their faction is large besides, and the whole state speaks for them. But the man of law and method who would come before the one above has no closeness of trust and love and no favor of long familiarity, and moreover he means to straighten the ruler's fawning and crooked heart with words of law and method. This sets him against the ruler. His place is low and mean; he has no party and stands alone. Now to contend from a distant and thin footing against one who is near and loved and trusted — the odds cannot be won. To contend as a new traveler against an old familiar — the odds cannot be won. To contend from crossing the ruler's mind against one who shares his likes and dislikes — the odds cannot be won. To contend from lightness and meanness against the honored and heavy — the odds cannot be won. To contend with one mouth against a whole state — the odds cannot be won. The man of law and method holds these five losing positions and cannot get an audience though the years go by, while the man in the seat of power rides five winning resources and speaks alone before the ruler morning and evening. Then by what road can the man of law and method come forward, and at what hour can the ruler wake? Since his resources must lose and the two positions cannot both remain, how can the man of law and method not be in danger? Those on whom a crime or a fault can be fastened are cut down by the public law; those on whom no crime or fault can be laid are brought to their end by a private sword. This is to say that one who makes law and method clear and crosses the ruler above, if he is not killed by the clerks' execution, is sure to die by a private sword. Those who make factions and stand close together to curtain off the ruler, and who bend their words to ease their private ends, are sure to be trusted by the minister of heavy power. So those for whom the merit of service can be borrowed are made honored with office and rank, and those who cannot be lent a fair name are made heavy with power from outside. Thus one who curtains off the ruler and hurries to the private house, if he does not stand out in office and rank, is sure to grow heavy with power from outside. Now the ruler cuts men down without matching and testing what they say, and gives out rank and stipend without waiting to see merit. How then can the man of law and method brave death to bring forward his teaching, and how would the treacherous minister be willing to ride his gain and withdraw himself? So the ruler above grows ever lower and the private house ever higher.
夫越雖國富兵強，中國之主皆知無益於己也，曰：「非吾所得制也。」今有國者雖地廣人衆，然而人主壅蔽，大臣專權，是國爲越也。智不類越，而不智不類其國，不察其類者也。人之所以謂齊亡者，非地與城亡也，呂氏弗制而田氏用之；所以謂晉亡者，亦非地與城亡也，姬氏不制而六卿專之也。今大臣執柄獨斷，而上弗知收，是人主不明也。與死人同病者，不可生也；與亡國同事者，不可存也。今襲跡於齊、晉，欲國安存，不可得也。
Now though the state of Yue be rich and its soldiers strong, the rulers of the Central States all know it is of no profit to them, and they say, "It is not a thing I can govern." Now one who holds a state, though his land be broad and his people many, if the ruler is blocked and curtained off and the great ministers hold power alone, then his state has become a Yue. He knows that in wisdom he is not of a kind with Yue, but he does not know that in his want of wisdom he is of a kind with his own state. He is one who does not examine what is of a kind with what. When people say that Qi perished, it was not land and walls that perished: it was that the Lü clan could not govern it and the Tian clan used it. When they say that Jin perished, that too was not land and walls perishing: it was that the Ji clan could not govern it and the six ministers held it alone. Now the great ministers grasp the handle and decide alone, and the one above does not know to take it back. This is a ruler who is not clear-sighted. One who shares a sickness with a dead man cannot be brought to life; one who shares a course with a fallen state cannot be kept standing. Now to tread in the tracks of Qi and Jin and wish the state to stand at peace — this cannot be had.
凡法術之難行也，不獨萬乘，千乘亦然。人主之左右不必智也，人主於人有所智而聽之，因與左右論其言，是與愚人論智也；人主之左右不必賢也，人主於人有所賢而禮之，因與左右論其行，是與不肖論賢也。智者決策於愚人，賢士程行於不肖，則賢智之士羞而人主之論悖矣。人臣之欲得官者，其脩士且以精絜固身，其智士且以治辯進業。其脩士不能以貨賂事人，恃其精潔而更不能以枉法爲治，則脩智之士不事左右、不聽請謁矣。人主之左右，行非伯夷也，求索不得，貨賂不至，則精辯之功息，而毁誣之言起矣。治辯之功制於近習，精潔之行決於毁譽，則脩智之吏廢，則人主之明塞矣。不以功伐決智行，不以叄伍審罪過，而聽左右近習之言，則無能之士在廷，而愚汙之吏處官矣。
Now the difficulty of putting law and method into practice belongs not only to the state of ten thousand chariots; the state of a thousand chariots is the same. Those at the ruler's left and right are not necessarily wise, yet when the ruler holds a man wise and listens to his words, he then weighs those words with his left and right. This is to weigh wisdom with fools. Those at the ruler's left and right are not necessarily worthy, yet when the ruler holds a man worthy and treats him with ceremony, he then weighs that man's conduct with his left and right. This is to weigh worth with the unworthy. When the wise man has his plans settled for him by fools, and the worthy officer has his conduct measured by the unworthy, then the worthy and wise officers are ashamed and the ruler's judgment goes crooked. Among the ministers who wish to gain office, the officer who has cultivated himself makes his person firm by purity, and the wise officer comes forward in his work by governing and sorting affairs. The officer who has cultivated himself cannot serve others with goods and bribes, and trusting in his purity he cannot bend the law to govern either. So the cultivated and wise officer does not serve the left and right and does not listen to their pleading. Those at the ruler's left and right are no Bo Yi in conduct, and when what they seek is not got and no bribe arrives, the merit of the pure and discerning man is stopped and words of slander and false charge arise. When the merit of governing and sorting affairs hangs upon the familiar intimates, and pure conduct is settled by slander and praise, then the cultivated and wise clerk is cast out and the ruler's clear sight is blocked. If he does not settle wisdom and conduct by merit of service, and does not sift crimes and faults by cross-checking, but listens to the words of the familiar intimates at his left and right, then officers of no ability will stand in the court and foolish, filthy clerks will sit in office.
萬乘之患，大臣太重；千乘之患，左右太信：此人主之所公患也。且人臣有大罪，人主有大失，臣主之利相與異者也。何以明之哉？曰：主利在有能而任官，臣利在無能而得事；主利在有勞而爵祿，臣利在無功而富貴；主利在豪傑使能，臣利在朋黨用私。是以國地削而私家富，主上卑而大臣重。故主失勢而臣得國，主更稱蕃臣，而相室剖符。此人臣之所以譎主便私也。故當世之重臣，主變勢而得固寵者，十無二三。是其故何也？人臣之罪大也。臣有大罪者，其行欺主也，其罪當死亡也。智士者遠見而畏於死亡，必不從重人矣；賢士者脩廉而羞與姦臣欺其主，必不從重臣矣。是當塗者之徒屬，非愚而不知患者，必汙而不避姦者也。大臣挾愚汙之人，上與之欺主，下與之收利侵漁，朋黨比周，相與一口，惑主敗法，以亂士民，使國家危削，主上勞辱，此大罪也。臣有大罪而主弗禁，此大失也。使其主有大失於上，臣有大罪於下，索國之不亡者，不可得也。
The trouble of the state of ten thousand chariots is that the great ministers are too heavy; the trouble of the state of a thousand chariots is that the left and right are trusted too far. This is the trouble rulers share in common. Again, that a minister has a great crime and a ruler a great fault comes of this: the profit of the minister and the profit of the ruler run apart from each other. How is this made clear? It is said: the ruler's profit lies in having able men and entrusting them with office, the minister's profit lies in getting business without ability; the ruler's profit lies in giving rank and stipend to those who have toiled, the minister's profit lies in growing rich and honored without merit; the ruler's profit lies in employing the outstanding according to their ability, the minister's profit lies in making factions to work his private ends. Thus the land of the state is pared away and the private houses grow rich, the ruler above is lowered and the great ministers grow heavy. So the ruler loses his position and the minister gains the state; the ruler comes instead to be called a vassal of the hedge, and the chief minister's house splits the tally. This is how a minister deceives his ruler and eases his private ends. So among the heavy ministers of this age, not two or three in ten keep a firm hold on favor when the ruler's position changes. What is the reason for this? It is that the minister's crime is great. To say a minister has a great crime is to say his conduct has deceived his ruler, and his crime deserves death. The wise officer sees far and dreads death, and is sure not to follow the minister of heavy power. The worthy officer cultivates his honesty and is ashamed to join a treacherous minister in deceiving his ruler, and is sure not to follow the heavy minister. So the followers of the man in the seat of power are either fools who do not know the danger or filthy men who do not shun treachery. The great minister keeps these foolish and filthy men at his side; above, he joins them in deceiving the ruler, and below, he joins them in gathering up profit and fishing the people dry. They make factions and stand close together, speaking with one mouth, beguiling the ruler and wrecking the law, throwing officers and commoners into disorder, bringing the state into danger and loss and the ruler above into toil and shame. This is the great crime. The minister has a great crime and the ruler does not forbid it: this is the great fault. To let the ruler have a great fault above and the minister a great crime below, and then to look for the state not to perish — this cannot be had.