Mougong — attacking by stratagem謀攻篇

興師深入長驅，距其城郭，絶其內外，敵舉國來服爲上。以兵擊破，敗而得之，其次也。

To raise an army, go in deep and drive far, reach his walls and ramparts and cut off the inside from the outside, so that the enemy brings his whole state over in surrender — that is best. To get it only after striking and breaking it with troops is next.

不貴殺也。韓信虜魏王豹、擒夏說、斬成安君，此爲破國者。及用廣武君計，北首燕路，遣一介之使，奉咫尺之書，燕從風而靡，則全國也。

Killing is not held dear. When Han Xin (韓信) took King Bao (豹) of Wei (魏) captive, seized Xia Yue (夏說) and beheaded the Lord of Cheng'an (成安君), he got these by breaking states. But when he used the plan of the Lord of Guangwu (廣武君), turned north onto the road to Yan (燕) and sent a single envoy bearing one short letter, Yan followed like grass before the wind — this was keeping a state whole.

全得其國，我國亦全，乃爲上。

He gets the enemy's state whole and his own state stays whole as well; this is best.

敵國來服爲上，以兵擊破爲次。

Having the enemy's state come over in surrender is best; striking and breaking it with troops is next.

若韓信舉燕是也。

Han Xin's taking Yan whole is such a case.

以方略氣勢，令敵人以國降，上策也。

Making the enemy surrender his whole state by plan and by momentum is the first of plans.

《尉繚子》曰：「講武料敵，使敵氣失而師散，雖形全而不爲之用，此道勝也。破軍殺將，乘堙發機，會衆奪地，此力勝也。」然則所謂道勝、力勝者，卽全國、破國之謂也。夫弔民伐罪，全勝爲上；爲不得已而至於破，則其次也。

The Wei Liaozi (尉繚子) says, "To train in arms and measure the enemy, so that the enemy loses his spirit and his army is scattered and, whole in shape, is yet of no use — this is winning by the Way. To break his army and kill his general, to mount the earthworks and shoot the engines, to gather a host and seize ground — this is winning by force." So what it calls winning by the Way and winning by force are just keeping a state whole and breaking a state. In comforting the people and punishing the guilty, winning whole is best; when there is no help for it and one comes to breaking, that is next.

《司馬法》曰：「一萬二千五百人爲軍。」

The Sima fa (司馬法) says, "Twelve thousand five hundred men make a jun (軍)."

降其城邑，不破我軍也。

It is making his cities and towns surrender without our own army being broken.

五百人爲旅。

Five hundred men make a lü (旅).

一校已下至一百人也。

From one jiao (校) down to a hundred men is a zu (卒).

百人已上爲卒。

A hundred men and above is called a zu.

一校下至百人也。

It runs from one jiao down to a hundred men.

百人已下至五人。

From a hundred men down to five men is a wu (伍).

百人已下爲伍。

A hundred men and below is called a wu.

五人爲伍。

Five men make a wu.

謀之大者，全得之。

He whose plans are great takes it whole.

國、軍、卒、伍，不間小大，全之則威德爲優，破之則威德爲劣。

State, jun, zu and wu alike, great or small: keep them whole and one's authority and virtue stand out; break them and one's authority and virtue fall.

自軍至伍，皆次序上下言之。此意以策略取之爲妙，不惟一軍，至於一伍，不可不全。

From jun down to wu, all are spoken of in order from the greater to the smaller. The meaning is that getting it by plan is held to be the fine thing, so that not a single jun only but even a single wu must be taken whole.

周制︰萬二千五百人爲軍，五百人爲旅，百人爲卒，五人爲伍。自軍至伍，皆以不戰而勝之爲上。

Under the Zhou (周) system twelve thousand five hundred men made a jun, five hundred men a lü, a hundred men a zu, and five men a wu. From jun down to wu, winning without fighting is held best in every case.

未戰而戰自屈，勝善也。

When he bends of himself before any fighting, that winning is the fine one.

以計勝敵也。

It is beating the enemy by plan.

戰必殺人故也。

Because fighting always kills men.

兵威遠振，全來降伏，斯爲上也；詭詐爲謀，摧破敵衆，殘人傷物，然後得之，又其次也。

When the army's authority carries far and the enemy comes over whole in surrender, that is best; to work by deceit and stratagem, break the enemy's host, kill men and spoil goods, and only then get it, is again next.

未戰而敵自屈服。

Before the fighting, the enemy surrenders of himself.

惡乎殺傷殘害也。

He hated the killing, the wounding and the harm.

戰而後能勝，必多殺傷，故云非善。

If one can win only after fighting, the dead and wounded are bound to be many; so it is said not to be the fine thing.

未戰而敵自屈服。

Before the fighting, the enemy surrenders of himself.

以計勝敵。

It is beating the enemy by plan.

韓信用李左車之計，馳咫尺之書，不戰而下燕城也。

Han Xin used the plan of Li Zuoche (李左車) and sped off one short letter, and so got the cities of Yan without fighting.

重廟勝也。

He makes much of settling the victory beforehand in the council hall.

兵貴伐謀，不務戰也。

Troops hold the striking of plans dear and do not labor at fighting.

後漢王霸討周建、蘇茂，旣戰歸營，賊復聚挑戰，霸堅卧不出。方饗士作倡樂，茂雨射營中，中霸前酒罇，霸安坐不動。軍吏曰：「茂已破，今易擊。」霸曰：「不然。茂客兵遠來，糧食不足，故挑戰，以徼一切之勝。今閉營休土，所謂不戰而屈人之兵，善之善也。」茂乃引退。

Wang Ba (王霸) of the Later Han (後漢), attacking Zhou Jian (周建) and Su Mao (蘇茂), fought one round and returned to camp; the enemy gathered again and offered battle, but Wang Ba lay fast and would not come out. He was just then feeding his men and having music played when Su Mao shot arrows into the camp like rain and struck the wine jar in front of Wang Ba; Wang Ba sat at ease and did not stir. An officer of the army said, "Su Mao is already broken; he is easy to strike now." Wang Ba said, "Not so. Su Mao's is a guest army (客軍) come from far, and his provisions are not ample, so he offers battle to get even one win. To close the camp now and rest the men is what is called bending another's troops without fighting — the best of the best." Su Mao then withdrew.

明賞罰，信號令，完器械，練士卒，暴其所長，使敵從風而靡，則爲大善。若吳王黃池之會，晉人畏其有法而服之者是也。

Make rewards and punishments clear, make orders trusted, keep the engines complete and the men trained, and show forth what one does well, so that the enemy follows like grass before the wind: that is greatly well done. When the King of Wu (吳) held the meeting at Huangchi (黃池) and the men of Jin (晉) feared his good order and submitted, such was the case.

敵始有謀，伐之易也。

Only while the enemy's plan is just forming is it easy to strike.

伐其始謀也。後漢宼恂圍高峻，峻遣謀臣皇甫文謁恂，辭禮不屈。恂斬之，報峻曰：「軍師無禮，已斬之。欲降，急降；不欲，固守。」峻卽日開壁而降。諸將曰：「敢問殺其使而降其城，何也？」恂曰：「皇甫文，峻之心腹，其取謀者。留之，則文得其計；殺之，則峻亡其膽，所謂上兵伐謀。」諸將曰：「非所知也。」

It is striking the plan while it is first being laid. When Kou Xun (寇恂) of the Later Han surrounded Gao Jun (高峻), Gao Jun sent his planning minister Huangfu Wen (皇甫文) to meet Kou Xun, and his words and manner were unbending. Kou Xun beheaded him and told Gao Jun, "Your army's counselor was without manners and has been beheaded. If you would surrender, surrender quickly; if not, hold fast." That same day Gao Jun opened his walls and surrendered. The generals said, "We venture to ask: how is it that killing his envoy brought his city to surrender?" Kou Xun said, "Huangfu Wen was Gao Jun's trusted man and the one who laid his plans. Spare him and Huangfu Wen carries his own plan through; kill him and Gao Jun loses his gall. This is what is meant by the highest use of troops being to strike the plan." The generals said, "This was not for us to know."

晉平公欲攻齊，使范昭往觀之，景公觴之。酒酣，范昭請君之罇酌。公曰：「寡人之罇進客。」范昭已飲，晏子徹罇更爲酌。范昭佯醉，不悅而起舞，謂太師曰：「能爲我奏成周之樂乎？吾爲舞之。」太師曰：「瞑臣不習。」范昭趨出。景公曰：「晉，大國也，來觀吾政。今子怒大國之使者，將奈何？」晏子曰：「觀范昭非陋於禮者，且欲慙於國，臣故不從也。」太師曰：「夫成周之樂，天子之樂也，惟人主舞之。今范昭人臣，而欲舞天子樂，臣故不爲也。」范昭歸，報晉平公曰：「齊未可伐。臣欲辱其君，晏子知之；臣欲犯其禮，太師識之。」仲尼曰：「不越罇俎之間，而折衝千里之外，晏子之謂也。」春秋時，秦伐晉，晉將趙盾禦之，上軍佐臾駢曰：「秦不能久，請深壘固軍以待之。」秦人欲戰，秦伯謂士會曰：「若何而戰？」對曰：「趙氏新出其屬曰臾駢，必實爲此謀，將以老我師也。趙有側室曰穿，晉君之壻也，有寵而弱，不在軍事，好勇而狂，且惡臾駢之佐上軍。若使輕者肆焉，其可。」秦軍掩晉上軍，趙穿追之不及，返，怒曰：「裹糧坐甲，固敵是求；敵至不擊，將何俟焉？」軍吏曰：「將有待也。」穿曰：「我不知謀，將獨出。」乃以其屬出。趙盾曰：「秦獲穿也，獲一卿矣！秦以勝歸，我何以報？」乃皆出戰，交綏而退。夫晏子之對，是敵人將謀伐我，我先伐其謀，故敵人不得而伐我。士會之對，是我將謀伐敵，敵人有謀拒我，乃伐其謀，敵人不得與我戰。斯二者，皆伐謀也。故敵欲謀我，伐其未形之謀；我若伐敵，敗其已成之計，固非止於一也。

Duke Ping (平公) of Jin, wishing to attack Qi, sent Fan Zhao (范昭) to look over that state, and Duke Jing (景公) set out wine for him. When the drinking had grown merry, Fan Zhao asked to be poured for with the ruler's own cup. Duke Jing said, "Offer my cup to the guest." When Fan Zhao had drunk it off, Yanzi (晏子) took that cup away and had another used for the pouring. Fan Zhao, feigning drunkenness, was displeased; he rose to dance and said to the Grand Music Master (太師), "Can you perform the music of Chengzhou (成周) for me? I will dance." The Grand Music Master said, "Your blind servant has not practiced it." Fan Zhao hurried out. Duke Jing said, "Jin is a great state, and this man came to look over our government. Now you have angered the envoy of a great state; what will you do?" Yanzi said, "Looking at Fan Zhao, he is not a man who does not know the rites. He meant rather to shame our state, and so your servant did not comply." The Grand Music Master said, "The music of Chengzhou is the music of the Son of Heaven, and only a ruler dances to it. Now Fan Zhao, being another's servant, wished to dance to the music of the Son of Heaven, and so your servant did not perform it." Fan Zhao went back and reported to Duke Ping of Jin, "Qi cannot be attacked. Your servant would have shamed their ruler, but Yanzi saw through it; your servant would have broken their rites, but the Grand Music Master knew it." Confucius (孔子) said, "Not to step beyond the space between cup and table and yet to break an enemy a thousand li away — this was said of Yanzi."

In the time of the Spring and Autumn, Qin attacked Jin, and Zhao Dun (趙盾), a general of Jin, warded them off; Yu Pian (臾駢), the aide of the upper army, said, "Qin cannot hold out long; deepen your works and make your army firm and wait." The men of Qin wished to fight, and the Earl of Qin (秦伯) asked Shi Hui (士會), "How shall we fight?" He answered, "Zhao's newly raised subordinate Yu Pian is surely the one who laid this plan, meaning to make our army old. Zhao has a son by a secondary wife, Chuan (穿), who is son-in-law to the ruler of Jin and is loved, but he is weak in strength and not in the business of war, and he loves valor and is fierce, and moreover he hates Yu Pian's aiding the upper army. Send swift troops to fall upon them and it will do." The troops of Qin fell upon the upper army of Jin, and Zhao Chuan pursued them but did not reach them; he came back angry and said, "To pack provisions and put on armor and sit is just to seek the enemy; when the enemy comes and we do not strike him, what are we waiting for?" An officer of the army said, "The general has something he is waiting for." Zhao Chuan said, "I do not know plans; I shall go out alone," and he went out with his own following. Zhao Dun said, "If Qin takes Chuan, it takes one of our ministers (卿). If Qin wins and goes home, with what shall I make my report?" So they all went out and fought, and the two sides withdrew from each other and it ended.

Yanzi's answer was this: when the enemy was planning to strike us, we struck his plan first, and so the enemy could not strike us. Shi Hui's answer was this: when we were planning to strike the enemy and the enemy laid a plan to ward us off, he struck that plan, and so the enemy could not fight us. Both of these are striking the plan. So if the enemy would plan against us, one strikes the plan whose shape has not yet appeared; and if we would strike the enemy, one breaks the design already made. It is not of one kind only from the start.

九攻九拒，是其謀也。

Striking nine times and warding it off nine times — such is the plan here.

敵方設謀，欲舉衆師，伐而抑之，是其上。故太公云「善除患者，理於未生；善勝敵者，勝於無形」也。

When the enemy is just laying his plan and about to raise a great host, to strike it and press it down is best. So Taigong (太公) said, "He who is good at warding off trouble sets it right before it arises; he who is good at beating the enemy wins while it has no shape."

以智勝。

It is winning by wisdom.

以智謀屈人最爲上。

To bend another by wisdom and plan is the highest of all.

敵始謀攻我，我先攻之，易也。揣知敵人謀之趣向，因而加兵，攻其彼心之發也。

When the enemy is only beginning to lay his plan to strike us, it is easy if we strike first. One measures and learns where the enemy's plan is turning, adds troops accordingly, and strikes the very place where his mind is rising.

敵始發謀，我從而攻之，彼必喪計而屈服，若晏子之沮范昭是也。或曰：伐謀者，用謀以伐人也，言以奇策祕算，取勝於不戰，兵之上也。

When the enemy is just laying his plan and we strike in step with it, he is bound to lose his design and bend; Yanzi's warding off Fan Zhao is such a case. Some say: striking the plan means using a plan to strike another — that by strange designs and hidden reckoning one gets the victory without fighting, and this is the highest use of troops.

交，將合也。

Alliance (交) is their being about to join hands.

伐其始交也。蘇秦約六國不事秦，而秦閉關十五年，不敢窺山東也。

It is striking the alliance while it is first being tied. Su Qin (蘇秦) bound the six states so that they would not serve Qin (秦), and for fifteen years Qin kept its passes closed and could not peer at Shandong (山東).

非止將合而已，合之者，皆可伐也。張儀願獻秦地六百里於楚懷王，請絶齊交。隨何於黥布坐上殺楚使者，以絶項羽。曹公與韓遂交馬語，以疑馬超。高洋以蕭深明請和於梁，以疑侯景，終陷臺城。此皆伐交。權道變化，非一途也。

Not only one just about to be joined: an alliance already joined can all be struck too. Zhang Yi (張儀) offered six hundred li of Qin land to King Huai (懷王) of Chu (楚) and asked him to break off his alliance with Qi (齊). Sui He (隨何) had the envoy of Chu killed in the seat of Ying Bu (黥布) and so broke him off from Xiang Yu (項羽). Lord Cao (曹公) rode abreast of Han Sui (韓遂) and talked with him, and so made Ma Chao (馬超) suspicious. Gao Yang (高洋) put Xiao Shenming (蕭深明) forward and sued Liang (梁) for peace, and so made Hou Jing (侯景) suspicious, and in the end Taicheng (臺城) fell. All these are striking the alliance. It shifts with the circumstances and is not one road only.

或云敵已興師交合，伐而勝之，是其次也。若晉文公敵宋，攜離曹、衞也。

Some say that striking and winning when the enemy has already raised his troops and closed with us is what comes next. Duke Wen (文公) of Jin, standing against the other side over Song (宋), split off Cao (曹) and Wei (衞); such is the case.

交合強國，敵不敢謀。

If one allies and joins with a strong state, the enemy dares not lay plans.

以威勝。

It is winning by authority.

謂未能全屈敵謀，當且間其交，使之解散。彼交，則事鉅敵堅；彼不交，則事小敵脆也。

It means that if one has not bent the enemy's plan whole, one should spread his alliances out and scatter them. When the other side has allies the affair grows large and the enemy firm; when it has none the affair grows small and the enemy soft.

杜稱已上四事，乃親而離之之義也。伐交者，兵欲交合，設疑兵以懼之，使進退不得，因來屈服。旁鄰旣爲我援，敵不得不孤弱也。

The four cases Du Mu (杜牧) gives above are just the meaning of splitting off those close to him. Striking the alliance means that when troops are about to close one spreads out a doubtful force to frighten him, so that he can neither go forward nor withdraw, and thereby brings him over bent. Once his neighbors are already our help, the enemy cannot but be left alone and weak.

兵將交戰，將合則伐之。《傳》曰：「先人有奪人之心。」謂兩軍將合，則先薄之，孫叔敖之敗晉師，厨人濮之破華氏是也。或曰：伐交者，用交以伐人也，言欲舉兵伐敵，先結鄰國爲掎角之勢，則我彊而敵弱。

It is striking while the troops are just about to fight and close. The *Zuo Commentary* (左傳) says, "Do it before another and you take another's heart." This means striking first while the two armies are about to close: Sun Shu'ao's (孫叔敖) breaking the army of Jin and Churen Pu's (厨人濮) breaking the Hua (華) are such cases. Some say: striking the alliance means using alliances to strike another — that in raising troops to strike the enemy one first ties oneself to the neighboring states and makes a shape that grips him front and back, so that we grow strong and the enemy weak.

兵形已成也。

This is after the shape of his army is already formed.

臨敵對陳，兵之下也。

To stand facing the enemy with ranks drawn up against his is the lowest use of troops.

善於攻取，舉無遺策，又其次也。故太公曰：「爭勝於白刃之前者，非良將也。」

To be good at striking and taking, with no plan wanting in anything one does, is again next. So Taigong said, "He who contends for victory before the bare blade is not a good general."

以戰勝。

It is winning by battle.

戰者危事。

Battle is a perilous affair.

不能敗其始謀，破其將合，則犀利兵器以勝之。兵者，器械之總名也。太公曰：「必勝之道，器械爲寶。」

If one cannot break his plan while it is forming, nor break what is about to be joined, then one sharpens one's weapons and wins. Bing (兵) is the general name for all the engines. Taigong said, "The way of certain victory is to treat the engines as treasure."

敵國已收其外糧城守，攻之爲下政也。

The enemy state has already gathered in the grain outside and is holding its walls, so attacking is the poorest plan of all.

夫王師出境，敵則開壁送款，舉櫬轅門，百姓怡悅，政之上也。若頓兵堅城之下，師老卒惰，攻守勢殊，客主力倍，以此政之爲下也。

When the ruler's army crosses the border, the enemy opens his walls and sends word of surrender, comes to the gate of the camp (轅門) bearing his own coffin, and the people rejoice: this is the highest of governing. To keep troops below a firm wall until the army grows old and the soldiers slack, while the shapes of attacker and defender differ and the strength of guest and host parts twofold: by this one becomes the lowest of governing.

言攻城屠邑、政之下者，所害者多。

To say that attacking cities and cutting down towns is the lowest of governing is because the harm it does is great.

費財役爲最下。

It spends goods and uses up men, and so is the lowest of all.

士卒殺傷，城或未克。

One's soldiers may be killed and wounded and the city still not be had.

夫攻城屠邑，不惟老師費財，兼亦所害者多，是爲攻之下者。

Attacking cities and cutting down towns not only makes the army old and spends goods but does much harm as well; this is the lowest of attacking.

攻城則力屈，所以必攻者，蓋不獲已耳。

Attack a city and strength is spent. That one attacks for all that is only because there is no help for it.

修，治也。櫓，大楯也。轒轀者，轒牀也。轒牀其下四輪，從中推之至城下也。具，備也。器械者，機關攻守之總名，飛樓、雲梯之屬。距闉者，踴土積高而前，以附其城也。

To fit out (修) means to put in order. The lu (櫓) is a great shield. The fenwen (轒轀) is the fenchuang (轒牀): four wheels are set under it and it is pushed from within until it reaches the foot of the wall. To make ready (具) means to have in hand. Engines is the general name for all the gear of attack and defense that hooks and hauls — the flying tower (飛樓), the cloud ladder (雲梯) and such. The juyin (距闉) is to heap earth up high and press forward with it until it joins the wall.

櫓，楯也，以蒙首而趨城下。轒轀者，四輪車也，其下藏兵數十人，填隍推之，直就其城，木石所不能壞也。器械，飛樓、雲梯、板屋、木幔之類也。距闉者，土木山乘城也。東魏高歡之圍晉州，侯景之攻臺城，則其器也。役約三月，恐兵久而人疲也。

The lu is a shield. One covers one's head with it and runs up under the wall. The fenwen is a four-wheeled wagon: a few score soldiers are hidden beneath it, and they fill the trench and push it right up to the wall, so that neither wood nor stone can break it. Engines are such things as the flying tower, the cloud ladder, the plank house (板屋) and the wooden curtain (木幔). The juyin is to make a hill of earth and timber and climb the wall by it. What Gao Huan (高歡) of the Eastern Wei (東魏) used when he surrounded Jinzhou (晉州), and what Hou Jing used in attacking Taicheng, were this gear. The work is reckoned at three months out of fear that keeping troops long will wear the men out.

櫓，卽今之所謂彭排。轒轀，四輪車，排大木爲之，上蒙以生牛皮，下可容十人，往來運土填塹，木石所不能傷，今俗所謂木驢是也。距闉者，積土爲之，卽今之所謂壘道也。三月者，一時也。言修治器械，更其距闉，皆須經時精好成就，恐傷人之甚也。《管子》曰：「不能致器者困。」言無以應敵也。太公曰：「必勝之道，器械爲寶。」《漢書‧志》曰：「兵之伎巧，一十有三家，習手足，便器械機關，以立攻守之勝者。」夫攻城者，有撞車、剗鈎車、飛梯、蝦蟇木、解合車、狐鹿車、影車、高障車、馬頭車、獨行車、運土豚魚車。

The lu is just what is now called a shield. The fenwen is a four-wheeled wagon made of great timbers set in a row and covered above with raw hide, and it can hold ten men beneath. They go to and fro carrying earth to fill the trench, and neither wood nor stone can harm it. What is now commonly called the mulü (木驢) is this. The juyin is made by heaping earth up, and is just what is now called the leidao (壘道). Three months is one season. It means that in putting the engines in order and in raising the juyin a whole season must pass before each is finely and well made, out of fear that the men will be badly hurt. The Guanzi (管子) says, "He who cannot ready his gear is in straits" — meaning that he has no way to meet the enemy. Taigong said, "The way of certain victory is to treat the engines as treasure." The "Treatise" (志) of the Han shu (漢書) says, "In the skill and craft of arms there are thirteen schools, which train hand and foot and make the engines and their mechanisms handy, and so set up the victory of attack and defense." For attacking a city there are the ramming car (撞車), the scraping-hook car (剗鈎車), the flying ladder (飛梯), the toad timber (蝦蟇木), the joining-and-parting car (解合車), the fox-and-deer car (狐鹿車), the shadow car (影車), the high-screen car (高障車), the horse-head car (馬頭車), the lone-going car (獨行車), and the earth-carrying pig-and-fish car (運土豚魚車).

杜稱櫓爲彭排，非也。若是彭排，卽當用此樐字。曹云大楯，庶或近之。蓋言候器械全具須三月，距闉又三月，已計六月；將若不待此而生忿速，必多殺士卒。故下云「將不勝其忿而蟻附之」，「災也」。

Du Mu is wrong to make the lu a shield. If it were a shield, the character lu (樐) should have been used. Cao Cao's (曹操) calling it a great shield is nearer the mark. In general it means that waiting for the engines to be fully ready takes three months and the juyin three months more, so that six months are already reckoned; and that if a general cannot wait this out and gives way to anger and haste, he is bound to get many of his men killed. That is why below it says, "the general cannot master his anger and has them swarm like ants," and calls it a disaster.

轒轀，上汾下溫。修櫓，長櫓也。轒轀，四輪車。皆可推而往來，冒以攻城。器械，謂雲梯、浮格衡、飛石、連弩之屬。攻城總名，言修其攻具，經一時乃成也。距闉者，踊土積高而前，以附於城也。積土爲山曰堙，以距敵城，觀其虛實，《春秋傳》曰「楚司馬子反乘堙而窺宋城」也。

In fenwen (轒轀) the upper character is read fen and the lower wen. The xiulu is a long shield. The fenwen is a four-wheeled wagon. Both can be pushed to and fro, and with them one attacks the city. Engines are such things as the cloud ladder, the floating frame-beam (浮格衡), the flying stone (飛石) and the linked crossbow (連弩). It is the general name for the gear of attacking cities, and it means that a season must pass before the gear of attack is put in order. The juyin is to raise earth high and press forward with it until it joins the wall. Earth heaped into a hill is called a yin (堙), and with it one draws near the enemy's wall and looks into where he is empty and where full. The *Chunqiu* Commentary (春秋傳) says, "Zifan (子反), the Marshal of Chu, mounted the earthwork and spied out the wall of Song."

威智不足以屈人，不獲已而攻城也，治攻具須經時也。曹公曰：「櫓，大楯也。轒轀者，轒牀也，其下四輪，從中推至城下也。器械，機關攻守之總名，蜚梯之屬也。」謂櫓爲大循，非也。兵之具甚衆，何獨言修大楯耶？今城上守禦樓曰櫓，櫓是轒牀上革屋，以蔽矢石者歟？

His authority and wisdom were not enough to bend another, so there was no help but to attack the city; and the gear of attack takes a season to ready. Lord Cao said, "The lu is a great shield. The fenwen is the fenchuang: it has four wheels beneath and is pushed from within until it reaches the foot of the wall. Engines is the general name for the mechanisms of attack and defense, such as the flying ladder (蜚梯)." To call the lu a great shield is wrong. The gear of war is very many; why should he speak only of putting great shields in order? What is now called a lu is the watch-house that holds a wall from above; is the lu not then the hide housing above the fenchuang, which wards off arrows and stones?

脩櫓，大楯也。《傳》曰：「晉侯登巢車以望楚軍。」《註》云：「巢車，車上爲櫓。」又︰「晉師圍偪陽，魯人建大車之輪，蒙之以甲，以爲櫓，左執之，右拔戟，以成一隊。」《註》云：「櫓，大楯也。」以此觀之，脩櫓爲大楯明矣。轒轀，四輪車，其下可覆數十人，運土以實隍者。器械，攻城總名也。三月者，約經時成也。或曰：孫子戒心忿而亟攻之，故權言以三月成器械，三月起距堙，其實不必三月也。城尚不能下，則又積土與城齊，使士卒上之，或觀其虛實，或毁其樓櫓，欲必取也。土山曰堙，楚子反乘堙而窺宋城是也。器械言成者，取其久而成就也。距堙言已者，以其經時而畢上也。皆「不得已」之謂。

The xiulu (脩櫓) is a great shield. The *Zuo Commentary* says, "The Marquis of Jin (晉侯) mounted the nest car (巢車) and looked out at the army of Chu," and its note says, "The nest car is a car with a lu built on it." It also says, "When the army of Jin surrounded Biyang (偪陽), the men of Lu (魯) set up the wheels of a great wagon, covered them with armor and made a lu of it, and holding it with the left hand and drawing a spear with the right they formed one company," and its note says, "The lu is a great shield." By this it is clear that the xiulu is a great shield. The fenwen is a four-wheeled wagon that can cover a few score men beneath it and carries earth to fill the trench. Engines is the general name for the gear of attacking cities. Three months reckons the passing of a season for the making. Some say: Sunzi warned against attacking in haste with an angry heart, and so said three months to make the engines and three months to raise the juyin, but it is not in fact just three months. If the city still cannot be brought down, one heaps earth up besides until it is level with the wall and sets soldiers on top of it, to look into where he is empty and where full, or to pull down his watch-houses and shields, meaning to have it without fail. A hill of earth is a yin: Zifan of Chu mounting the earthwork and spying out the wall of Song is such a case. Saying the engines are made takes the sense of their taking long to finish; saying the juyin is done means that a season passes before all of it is piled up. Both are the words "there is no help for it."

將忿，不待攻器成，而使士卒緣城而上，如蟻之緣牆，必殺傷士卒也。

The general in his anger does not wait for the siege gear to be ready but has his soldiers climb the wall, like ants crawling up a fence, and so he is bound to get them killed and wounded.

將怒而不待攻城，而使士卒肉薄登城，如蟻之所附牆，爲木石所殺之者，三有一焉，而城不拔者，此攻之災也。

The general in his anger does not wait for the gear of attacking the city but has his soldiers climb the wall bare, like ants clinging to a fence; and if one man in three dies by wood and stone and the city still does not fall, this is the disaster of attacking.

此言爲敵所辱，不勝忿怒也。後魏太武帝率十萬衆，宼宋臧質於盱眙。太武帝始就質求酒，質封溲便與之。太武大怒，遂攻城。乃命肉薄登城，分番相代；墜而復昇，莫有退者，屍與城平，復殺其高梁王。如此三旬，死者過半。太武聞彭城斷其歸路，見疾疫甚衆，乃解退。《傳》曰：「一女乘城，可敵十夫。」以此校之，尚恐不啻。

This speaks of being shamed by the enemy and not mastering one's anger. Emperor Taiwu (太武帝) of the Later Wei (後魏) led a hundred thousand men and attacked Zang Zhi (臧質) of Song at Xuyi (盱眙). Taiwu had at first asked Zang Zhi for wine, and Zang Zhi sent him sealed urine. Taiwu was greatly angered and at once attacked the wall. He ordered the men to climb it bare and divided them into turns to relieve one another, so that those who fell climbed again and none withdrew, and the dead lay level with the wall; his own Prince of Gaoliang (高梁王) died as well. When it had gone on thirty days, more than half were dead. Taiwu heard that Pengcheng (彭城) had cut his road home, and saw that the plague was very heavy, so he raised the siege and withdrew. The *Zuo Commentary* says, "One woman on a wall can match ten men"; measured by this, one fears the loss does not stop there.

但使人心外附，士卒內離，城乃自拔。

Only make men's hearts cling to the outside and the soldiers split within, and the city falls of itself.

守過二時，敵人不服，將不勝心之忿，多使士卒蟻附其城，殺傷我士民三分之一也。言攻趣不拔，還爲己害。故韓非曰：「夫一戰不勝，則禍暨矣。」

If one holds on past two seasons and the enemy does not submit, the general cannot master the anger of his heart and sends many men to cling to the wall like ants, so that one in three of our soldiers and people is killed or wounded. It means that if one attacks in haste and still cannot bring it down, it turns back into one's own harm. So Han Fei (韓非) said, "Fight once and fail to win, and the calamity reaches you."

將心忿急，使士卒如蟻緣而登，死者過半，城且不下，斯害也已。

The general's heart is angry and hasty and he has his men crawl up like ants, so that more than half die and the city still does not fall; this is the harm.

攻逾二時，敵猶不服，將心忿躁，不能持久，使戰士蟻緣而登城，則其士卒爲敵人所殺三中之一，而堅城終不可拔，茲攻城之害也已。或曰：將心忿速，不俟六月之久，而亟攻之，則其害如此。

If one attacks past two seasons and the enemy still does not submit, the general's heart grows angry and impatient; he cannot hold out long and has his fighting men crawl up the wall like ants, so that one in three of his soldiers is killed by the enemy and the firm city is never brought down: this is the harm of attacking a city. Some say: the general's heart grows angry and hasty, he cannot wait out the length of six months but attacks in haste, and the harm is like this.

以計屈敵，非戰之屈者。晉將郭淮圍麴城，蜀將姜維來救。淮趨牛頭山，斷維糧道及歸路。維大震，不戰而遁，麴城遂降。則不戰而屈之義也。

It is bending the enemy by plan, not bending him by fighting. When Guo Huai (郭淮), a general of Jin, surrounded Qucheng (麴城), Jiang Wei (姜維), a general of Shu (蜀), came to its relief. Guo Huai hurried to Mount Niutou (牛頭山) and cut Jiang Wei's road of provisions and his road home. Jiang Wei was greatly alarmed and fled without fighting, and Qucheng surrendered in the end. This is the meaning of bending another without fighting.

周亞夫敵七國，引兵東北，壁昌邑，以梁委吳，使輕兵絶吳餉道。吳、梁相弊而食竭，吳遁去，因追擊，大破之。蜀將姜維使將勾安、李韶守麴城，魏將陳泰圍之。姜維來救，出自牛頭山，與泰相對。泰曰：「兵法貴在不戰而屈人，今絶牛頭，維無返道，則我之擒也。諸軍各守勿戰，絶其還路。」維懼，遁走，安等遂降。

When Zhou Yafu (周亞夫) stood against the seven states, he led his troops northeast, camped at Changyi (昌邑), left Liang to Wu, and with light troops cut Wu's road of provisions. Wu and Liang wore each other out and their food ran out, and Wu fled; he then pursued and struck them and broke them greatly. When Jiang Wei, a general of Shu, sent his generals Gou An (勾安) and Li Shao (李韶) to hold Qucheng, Chen Tai (陳泰), a general of Wei, surrounded it. Jiang Wei came to its relief and came out at Mount Niutou to face Chen Tai. Chen Tai said, "The art of war holds dear the bending of another without fighting. If we cut off Mount Niutou now, Jiang Wei will have no road home and will be taken by us. Let each army hold its ground and not fight, and cut his road home." Jiang Wei took fright and fled, and Gou An and the rest surrendered in the end.

戰則傷人。

Fighting harms men.

若李左車說成安君，請以奇兵三萬人扼韓信於井陘之策是也。

The plan Li Zuoche put to the Lord of Cheng'an, asking for thirty thousand men as a surprise force to ward off Han Xin at Jingxing (井陘), is such a case.

言伐謀、伐交，不至於戰。故《司馬法》曰：「上謀不鬬。」其旨見矣。

It means that if one strikes the plan and strikes the alliance, it does not come to fighting. So the Sima fa says, "The highest plan does not fight," and the meaning is plain.

前所陳者，庸將之爲耳。善用兵者則不然，或破其計，或敗其交，或絶其糧，或斷其路，則可不戰而服之。若田穰苴明法令，拊士卒，燕、晉聞之，不戰而遁亦是也。

What was said before is only what a common general does. One who is good at using troops is not so. Break his design, or break his alliances, or cut his provisions, or cut his roads, and one can make him submit without fighting. When Tian Rangju (田穰苴) made his laws and orders clear and soothed his troops, Yan and Jin heard of it and fled without fighting; that too is such a case.

以計取之。後漢酇侯臧宮圍妖賊於原武，連月不拔，士卒疾癘。東海王謂宮曰：「今擁兵圍必死之虜，非計也。宜撤圍，開其生路而示之，彼必逃散，一亭長足擒也。」從之，而拔原武。魏攻壺關，亦其義也。

It is taking it by design. When Zang Gong (臧宮), the Marquis of Zan (酇侯) of the Later Han, surrounded the sorcerous bandits at Yuanwu (原武), he could not bring them down for several months and his troops fell sick. The Prince of Donghai (東海王) said to Zang Gong, "To gather troops now and surround captives who must die is no design. You should draw off the siege and show them a road to live, and they are bound to flee and scatter, so that one village head (亭長) would be enough to take them." He followed those words and got Yuanwu. Wei's attack on Huguan (壺關) was of this meaning too.

司馬文王圍諸葛誕於壽春，議者多欲急攻之。文王以誕城固衆多，攻之力屈，若有外救，表裏受敵，此至危之道也。吾當以全策縻之，可坐制也。誕二年五月反，三年二月破滅。六軍按甲，深溝高壘，而誕自困。十六國前燕將慕容恪率兵討段龕於廣固，恪圍之。諸將勸恪急攻之，恪曰：「軍勢有緩而克敵，有急而取之。若彼我勢旣均，外有強援，力足制之，當羈縻守之，以待其斃。」乃築室反耕，嚴固圍壘，終克廣固，曾不血刃也。

When Sima, King Wen (司馬文王), surrounded Zhuge Dan (諸葛誕) at Shouchun (壽春), those who debated it mostly wished to attack in haste. King Wen held that Zhuge Dan's walls were firm and his host many, so that attacking would spend his strength, and that if relief came from outside he would meet the enemy front and back — a most perilous road. "I shall hold him with a plan that keeps all whole, and press him down while sitting still." Zhuge Dan revolted in the fifth month of the second year and was broken and gone by the second month of the third year. The six armies only held their armor down, deepened their ditches and raised their ramparts, and Zhuge Dan came to straits of himself. In the time of the Sixteen States, Murong Ke (慕容恪), a general of the Former Yan (前燕), led troops to attack Duan Kan (段龕) at Guanggu (廣固) and surrounded him. The generals urged a hasty attack, but Murong Ke said, "In the shapes of war there is beating the enemy by going slowly and there is taking him by going fast. Even if his force and mine are already even and he has strong relief outside, so long as my strength is enough to hold him down, I should tie him fast and hold my ground and wait for him to fall." So he built houses and tilled fields and kept his siege lines and ramparts strictly firm, and in the end he got Guanggu without staining a blade with blood.

言以威刑服敵，不攻而取，若鄭伯肉袒以迎楚莊王之類。

It speaks of making the enemy submit by authority and punishment and taking it without attacking — such as the Earl of Zheng (鄭伯) baring his shoulder to receive King Zhuang (莊王) of Chu.

攻則傷財。

Attacking harms goods.

若唐太宗降薛仁杲是也。

Emperor Taizong (太宗) of the Tang (唐) bringing Xue Rengao (薛仁杲) to surrender is such a case.

或攻其所必救，使敵棄城而來援，則設伏取之。若耿弇攻臨淄而克西安，脅巨里而斬費邑是也。或外絶其強援，以久持之，坐俟其斃，若楚師築室反耕以服宋是也。茲皆不攻而拔城之義也。

Sometimes one strikes the place the enemy must relieve, so that he leaves his city and comes to its relief, and then one sets an ambush and takes it. Geng Yan (耿弇) striking Linzi (臨淄) and getting Xi'an (西安), and threatening Juli (巨里) and beheading Fei Yi (費邑), are such cases. Sometimes one cuts off his strong relief from outside and holds out long, sitting and waiting for him to fall. The army of Chu building houses and tilling fields and bringing Song to submit is such a case. All these are the meaning of bringing a city down without attacking it.

毁滅人國，不久露師也。

He brings down another's state, yet does not leave his troops exposed in the field for long.

以術毁人國，不久而斃。隋文問僕射高熲伐陳之策，熲曰：「江外田收，與中國不同。伺彼農時，我正暇豫，徵兵掩襲，彼釋農守禦，候其聚兵，我便解退。再三若此，彼農事疲矣。又南方地卑，舍悉茅竹，倉庫儲積，悉依其間，密使行人，因風縱火，候其營立，更爲之。」行其謀，陳始病也。

It is pulling another's state down by plan so that it falls before long. When Emperor Wen (文帝) of the Sui (隋) asked Gao Jiong (高熲), his vice-director (僕射), for a plan to attack Chen (陳), Gao Jiong said, "Beyond the river the season for taking in the grain is not the same as in the middle land. Let us watch for their farming season and, at a time when we are at leisure, pick troops and fall upon them; they will leave their farming to hold their ground, and when we wait for them to gather their troops we withdraw at once. Do this two or three times and their farming is worn out. Moreover the south lies low and their houses are all of thatch and bamboo, and what is stored in their granaries is all among them; so let us send men secretly to set fires with the wind, and when we wait for them to build again, do the same once more." That plan was carried out, and Chen began to sicken.

因敵有可乘之勢，不失其機，如摧枯朽。沛公入關，晉降孫皓，隋取陳氏，皆不久之。

When the enemy has a shape that can be ridden, follow it and do not lose the moment, and it is like snapping something dry. The Lord of Pei (沛公) entering the Pass (關), Jin bringing Sun Hao (孫皓) to surrender, and Sui getting the house of Chen were all matters that did not take long.

兵不可久，久則生變。但毁滅其國，不傷殘於人，若武王伐殷，殷人稱爲父母。

Troops cannot be kept long; keep them long and something untoward arises. One only pulls that state down and wipes it out, without harming or hurting men — as when King Wu (武王) attacked Yin (殷) and the men of Yin called him father and mother.

若誅理暴逆，毁滅敵國，不暴師衆也。

It is cutting down and setting right the fierce and the crosswise, and so pulling down and wiping out the enemy state, without leaving one's troops long exposed.

久則生變。

Keep them long and something untoward arises.

王晳同梅堯臣《註》。

Wang Xi's (王晳) note is the same as Mei Yaochen's (梅堯臣).

善攻者，不以兵攻，以計困之，令其自拔，令其自毁，非勞久守而取之也。

One who is good at attacking does not attack with troops but puts the enemy in straits by design, so that he falls of himself and is pulled down of himself; it is not had by holding on long at hard labor.

以順討逆，以智伐愚，師不久暴，而敵國滅，何假六月之稽乎！

Strike the crosswise with the compliant and strike the foolish with the wise, and the enemy state is wiped out without leaving one's troops long exposed; what need is there to borrow the length of six months?

不與敵戰，而必完全得之，立勝於天下，不頓兵血刃也。

Without fighting the enemy he takes it whole without fail and sets up his victory over all under Heaven, so he neither blunts his troops nor bloodies a blade.

以全勝之計爭天下，是以不頓收利也。

He contends for all under Heaven with a design that wins whole, and so he gathers the gain without blunting his troops.

全爭者，兵不戰，城不攻，毁不久，皆以謀而屈敵，是曰「謀攻」，故不鈍兵利自完。

To contend with wholeness is this: the troops do not fight, the city is not attacked, the pulling down does not take long, and in each case the enemy is bent by plan. This is called attacking by stratagem. So his troops are not dulled and the gain is whole of itself.

不戰則士不傷，不攻則力不屈，不久則財不費。以完全立勝於天下，故無頓兵血刃之害，而有國富兵強之利，斯良將計攻之術也。

If one does not fight, the troops are not hurt; if one does not attack, strength is not spent; if it does not take long, goods are not spent. He sets up his victory over all under Heaven with wholeness, and so there is none of the harm of blunting troops and bloodying blades, and there is the gain of a state grown rich and an army grown strong. This is how a good general attacks by stratagem.

以十敵一則圍之，是將智勇等而兵利鈍均也；若主弱客強，不用十也。操所以倍兵圍下邳生擒呂布也。

Surrounding them at ten to one is said of when the generals are a match in wisdom and courage and the troops are even in keenness and dullness. If the side holding is weak and the side attacking is strong, one does not need ten. My own surrounding of Xiapi (下邳) with twice their number and taking Lü Bu (呂布) alive is such a case.

圍者，謂四面壘合，使敵不得逃逸。凡圍四合，必須去敵城稍遠，占地旣廣，守備須嚴，若非兵多，則有闕漏，故用兵有十倍也。呂布敗，是上下相疑，侯成執陳宮委布降，所以能擒，非曹公兵力而能取之。若上下相疑，政令不一，設使不圍，自當潰叛，何況圍之，固須破滅。孫子所言「十則圍之」，是將勇智等而兵利鈍均，不言敵人自有離叛。曹公稱倍兵降布，蓋非圍之力窮也，此不可以訓也。

To surround means to ring the four sides with earthworks so that the enemy cannot flee. Now to encircle all four sides one must stand a little back from the enemy's wall, so the ground held grows wide and the guarding must be strict; and if the troops are not many, empty and leaking places appear. That is why one uses ten times the troops. Lü Bu was beaten because high and low came to distrust one another, and Hou Cheng (侯成) seized Chen Gong (陳宮), abandoned Lü Bu and surrendered; his capture was not won by the strength of Lord Cao's army. Where high and low distrust one another and the orders of government (政令) are not of one voice, they will collapse and turn traitor of themselves even without being surrounded, all the more so once surrounded, when they were bound to be broken and destroyed. When Sunzi (孫子) said "at ten times, surround them," he spoke of the case where the generals are equal in courage and wisdom and the troops even in keenness and dullness; he did not speak of the enemy having men who desert and turn traitor of their own accord. To say that Lord Cao made Lü Bu surrender with twice the troops is not a case where the force of encirclement was spent, and it cannot be taken as the teaching here.

愚智、勇怯等，十倍於敵則圍之，攻守殊勢也。

When folly and wisdom, courage and cowardice are equal, at ten times the enemy you surround them. It is because the position of the attacker and that of the defender are different.

以十敵一則圍之，是爲將智勇等而兵利鈍均也。若主弱客勁，不用十也。曹公操所以倍兵圍下邳，生擒呂布。若敵堅壘固守，依附險阻，彼一我十，乃可圍也。敵雖盛，所據不便，未必十倍然後圍之。

Ten against one, and you surround them; this is the case where the generals are equal in wisdom and courage and the troops even in keenness and dullness. If the host is weak and the guest is firm, one does not use ten. Lord Cao, Cao Cao, surrounded Xiapi with twice the troops and took Lü Bu alive; that is such a case. If the enemy holds his earthworks firmly and leans on difficult ground, then he must be one and we ten before we can surround him. If the enemy is many but the place he holds is not easy, it is not that we surround him only after we are tenfold.

彼一我十，可以圍。

If he is one and we are ten, we can surround him.

圍者，四面合兵以圍城。而校量彼我兵勢，將才愚智、勇怯等，而我十倍勝於敵人，是以十對一，可以圍之，無令越逸也。

To surround means to gather troops on the four sides and ring the city. Weighing his military position against mine, if the generals' gifts are equal in folly and wisdom, courage and cowardice, and we are ten times better than the enemy, this is ten facing one, and we can encircle him so that he cannot climb out and flee.

吾之衆十倍於敵，則四面圍合以取之，是爲將智勇等而兵利鈍均也。若主弱客強，不必十倍然後圍之。《尉繚子》曰：「守法：一而當十，十而當百，百而當千，千而當萬。」言守者十人，而當圍者百人，與此法同。

If our host is ten times the enemy, we can ring and enclose all four sides. This is the case where the generals are equal in wisdom and courage and the troops even in keenness and dullness. If the host is weak and the guest strong, it is not that we surround him only after we are tenfold. The *Weiliaozi* says, "The way of defending is that one meets ten, ten meet a hundred, a hundred meet a thousand, and a thousand meet ten thousand." This says that ten defenders meet a hundred besiegers, and it is the same as this rule.

以五敵一，則三術爲正，二術爲奇。

At five to one, three parts are used for the straight attack and two for the surprise.

五則攻之，攻守勢殊也。

At five times, attack. It is because the position of the attacker and that of the defender are different.

術，猶道也，言以五敵一，則當取己三分爲三道，以攻敵之一面；留己之二，候其無備之處，出奇而乘之。西魏末，梁州刺史宇文仲和據州，不受代。魏將獨孤信率兵討之，仲和嬰城固守。信夜令諸將以衝梯攻其東北，信親帥將士襲其西南，遂克之也。

Shu (術) is like a road. It says that with five against one you should take three parts of your own, divide them into three roads and strike one face of the enemy, and keep two parts back to watch for where the enemy is unprepared and send out extraordinary troops to ride upon it. At the end of the Western Wei (西魏), Yuwen Zhonghe (宇文仲和), the governor of Liangzhou (梁州), held that province and would not accept his replacement. The Wei general Dugu Xin (獨孤信) led troops and attacked him, and Yuwen Zhonghe clung to the city and held it firmly. By night Dugu Xin had his several generals strike the northeast with assault ladders (衝梯), while he himself led troops and fell upon the southwest, and in the end he won.

兵旣五倍於敵，自是我有餘力，彼之勢分也，豈止分爲三道以攻敵？此獨說攻城，故下文云：「小敵之堅，大敵之擒也。」

If the troops are already five times the enemy, we have strength to spare and his position is split, so why divide into only three roads to strike him? This speaks only of attacking a city. That is why the text below says, "When the small side stubbornly holds out, it is taken captive by the great one."

若敵并兵自守，不與我戰，彼一我五，乃可攻戰也。或無敵人內外之應，未必五倍然後攻。

If the enemy joins his troops together and guards himself and will not fight us, then he must be one and we five before we can attack and fight. If the enemy has no answering force within and without, it is not that we attack him only after we are fivefold.

梅堯臣同杜佑《註》。

Mei Yaochen's note is the same as Du You's (杜佑).

謂十圍而取五，則攻者皆勢力有餘，不待其虛懈也。此以下亦謂智勇、利鈍均耳。

Five is taken away from the ten that surround, and it says that the attacker has position and strength to spare throughout and does not wait for the enemy to grow empty and slack. What follows below likewise speaks only of the case where wisdom and courage, keenness and dullness are even.

愚智勇怯等，量我五倍多於敵人，可以三分攻城，二分出奇以取勝。

If folly and wisdom, courage and cowardice are equal and we reckon ourselves five times the enemy, then with three parts we attack the city and with two we send out extraordinary troops, and we can win.

吾之衆五倍於敵，則當驚前掩後，衝東擊西；無五倍之衆，則不能爲此計。曹公謂三術爲正，二術爲奇，不其然乎？若敵無外援，我有內應，則不須五倍然後攻之。

If our host is five times the enemy, we should startle his front and fall upon his rear, stab at the east and strike at the west. Without a host of five times over, this plan cannot be used. Is this not what Lord Cao meant in saying that three roads are made the regular troops and two the extraordinary? If the enemy has no relief from outside and we have an answering force within, there is no need to wait until we are fivefold before attacking.

以二敵一，則一術爲正，一術爲奇。

At two to one, one part is used for the straight attack and one for the surprise.

夫兵者倍於敵，則分半爲奇；我衆彼寡，動而難制。符堅至淝水，不分而敗；王僧辯至張公洲，分而勝也。

When the troops are twice the enemy, split off half and make them extraordinary troops. When we are many and he is few, he is hard to hold down even when he moves. Fu Jian (苻堅) came to the Fei River (淝水) and did not divide, and so he lost; Wang Sengbian (王僧辯) came to Zhanggongzhou (張公洲) and divided, and so he won.

此言非也。此言以二敵一，則當取己之一，或趣敵之要害，或攻敵之必救，使敵一分之中，復須分減相救，因以一分而擊之。夫戰法，非論衆寡，每陳皆有奇正，非待人衆，然後能設奇。項羽於烏江，二十八騎尚不聚之，猶設奇正，循環相救，況於其他哉！

This saying is wrong. With two against one, you should take one part of your own and run to the enemy's vital and vulnerable place, or strike where he must send relief, so that out of his one part he splits off more to relieve it, and then with your one part you strike. The way of fighting does not count on many or few. Every formation has both extraordinary and regular troops; it is not that one can set out extraordinary troops only after one's men have grown many. At the Wu River (烏江) Xiang Yu did not even gather his twenty-eight horsemen together, and still he set out extraordinary and regular troops and had them relieve one another in turn, how much more so in other cases.

直言我倍於敵，分兵趨其所必救，卽我倍中更倍，以擊敵之中分也。杜雖得之，未盡其說也。

Put plainly: when we are twice the enemy and we divide our troops and run to the place he must relieve, then out of our double we become double again and strike the enemy where he has split. Du Mu caught the sense of it, but he did not say it fully.

己二敵一，則一術爲正，一術爲奇。彼一我二，不足爲變，故疑兵分離其軍也。故太公曰：「不能分移，不可以語奇。」

If I am two and the enemy one, one road is made the regular troops and one the extraordinary. If he is one and we are two, that is not enough to work changes with, so we use feint troops to split his army apart. That is why Taigong said, "If you cannot divide and shift, you cannot speak of extraordinary troops."

彼一我二，可分其勢。

If he is one and we are two, we can divide his position.

謂分者，分爲二軍，使其腹背受敵，則我得一倍之利也。

To divide means to split into two armies so that the enemy meets an enemy both in front and behind; then we gain twice the advantage.

兵倍於敵，則分半爲奇；我衆彼寡，足可分兵。主客力均，善戰者勝也。

When the troops are twice the enemy, split off half and make them extraordinary troops. When we are many and he is few, there is enough to divide the troops with. When the strength of host and guest is even, the one who fights well wins.

吾之衆一倍於敵，則當分爲二部：一以當其前，一以衝其後。彼應前，則後擊之；應後，則前擊之。茲所謂「一術爲正，一術爲奇」也。杜氏不曉兵分則爲奇，聚則爲正，而遽非曹公，何誤也！

If our host is twice the enemy, we should divide into two parts, one to face his front and one to stab at his rear. When they meet the front, we strike from behind; when they meet the rear, we strike from the front. This is what is meant by "one road the regular troops, one road the extraordinary." Du (杜氏) did not understand that troops divided become the extraordinary and troops gathered become the regular, and flatly called Lord Cao wrong; how is he himself not wrong?

己與敵人衆等，善者猶當設伏奇以勝之。

Even when my numbers and the enemy's are equal, one who is good at this sets an ambush and a surprise, and so wins.

主客力敵，惟善者戰。

When the strength of host and guest is matched, only the one who is able fights.

此說非也。凡己與敵人兵衆多少、智勇利鈍一旦相敵，則可以戰。夫伏兵之設，或在敵前，或在敵後，或因深林叢薄，或因暮夜昏晦，或因隘阨山阪，擊敵不備，自名伏兵，非奇兵也。

This saying is wrong. When my troops and the enemy's are alike matched in number and in wisdom, courage, keenness and dullness, then we can fight. Setting an ambush may be done in front of the enemy or behind him, may follow deep woods and thick grass or the dusk and the dark of night, or may follow a narrow, closed hillside to strike where the enemy is unprepared; this is properly called an ambush, and it is not extraordinary troops.

料己與敵人衆寡相等，先爲奇兵可勝之計，則戰之。故下文云：「不若則能避之。」杜說奇伏，得之也。

If we reckon my numbers and the enemy's to be the same, we first lay a plan to win with extraordinary troops and only then fight. That is why the text below says, "If no match at all, you can avoid them." In speaking of extraordinary troops and ambushes, Du Mu caught the sense of it.

勢力均則戰。

When position and strength are even, we fight.

謂能者能感士卒心，得其死戰耳。若設奇伏以取勝，是謂智優，不在兵敵也。

"Can" here means only that one can move the soldiers' hearts and make them fight to the death. To win by setting out extraordinary troops and ambushes is called the better wisdom, and it does not rest on the troops being matched.

敵，言等敵也。唯能者可以戰勝耳。

Di (敵) here means being a match for one another. Only the one who is able can fight and win.

彼我相敵，則以正爲奇，以奇爲正，變化紛紜，使敵莫測，以與之戰。茲所謂設奇伏以勝之也。杜氏不曉凡置陳皆有揚奇備伏，而云伏兵當在山林，非也。

When he and I are matched, we make the regular troops extraordinary and the extraordinary regular, changing them about in confusion so that the enemy cannot reckon us, and then we fight. This is what is meant by winning through extraordinary troops and ambushes. Du did not understand that in setting a formation there is always the showing of extraordinary troops and the readying of an ambush, and said that an ambush should be set in mountains and woods; he was wrong.

高壁堅壘，勿與戰也。

Raise your walls high and make your ramparts firm, and do not give battle.

量力不如，則堅壁不出，挫其鋒，待其氣懈，而出奇擊之。齊將田單守卽墨，燒牛尾，卽殺騎刼，則其義也。

If on reckoning his strength he falls short, he makes his walls firm and does not go out, blunting the enemy's keenness and waiting for his spirit to slacken, and then sends out extraordinary troops and strikes. The Qi general Tian Dan (田單) held Jimo (卽墨), set fire to the tails of oxen and killed Qi Jie (騎劫); that is the sense of it.

兵不敵，且避其鋒，當俟隙，便奮決求勝。言能者，謂能忍忿受耻，敵人求挑不出也，不似曹咎汜水之戰也。

If the troops are no match, first avoid the enemy's keenness, and wait for an opening and then rouse yourself, settle it and seek the victory. "Can" means being able to swallow anger and bear shame, so that one does not go out even when the enemy offers battle; it is not like Cao Jiu's (曹咎) battle at the Si River (汜水).

此說非也。但敵人兵倍於我，則宜避之，以驕其志，用爲後圖，非謂忍忿受耻。太宗辱宋老生以虜其衆，豈是兵力不等也？

This saying is wrong. It only means that when the enemy's troops are twice ours we should avoid him, let his mind grow arrogant, and make that our plan for what comes after; it does not speak of swallowing anger and bearing shame. When Taizong shamed Song Laosheng (宋老生) and took his host captive, was that because the strength of the troops was uneven?

彼衆我寡，逃匿兵形，不令敵知，當設奇伏以待之，設詐以疑之，亦取勝之道。又，一云：逃匿兵形，敵不知所備，懼其變詐，全軍亦逃。

When he is many and we are few, hide the shape of the troops so that the enemy cannot know it, set out extraordinary troops and ambushes and wait, and lay out deceits to make him doubt; this too is a way of gaining the victory. Put another way: when the shape of the troops is hidden, the enemy does not know what to prepare for, and fearing our deceits and changes, his whole army also runs away.

高壁堅壘，勿與戰也。彼之衆，我之寡，不可敵，則當自逃，守匿其形。

Raise the walls high and make the earthworks firm, and do not fight. If they are many and we are few and we cannot stand against them, we should take ourselves away, hide our shape and hold.

彼衆我寡，去而勿戰。

When he is many and we are few, we leave and do not fight.

逃，伏也，謂能倚固逃伏以自守也。《傳》曰：「師逃于夫人之宮。」或兵少而有以勝者，蓋將優卒強耳。

To flee means to hide, and it says that one can lean on a firm place and hide there and hold oneself. The *Zuo Commentary* says, "The soldiers hid in the lady's palace." That there are cases of winning with few troops is only because the general is the better man and the soldiers are strong.

兵少固壁，觀變潛形，見可則進。

When the troops are few, make the walls firm, watch for changes, hide your shape, and advance when you see something that can be done.

彼衆我寡，宜逃去之，勿與戰，是亦爲將智勇等而兵利鈍均也。若我治彼亂，我奮彼怠，則敵雖衆，亦可以合戰。若吳起以五百乘破秦五十萬衆，謝玄以八千卒敗苻堅一百萬，豈須逃之乎？

When he is many and we are few, we should flee and leave and not fight. This too is the case where the generals are equal in wisdom and courage and the troops even in keenness and dullness. If we are well ordered and they are in disorder, if we are roused and they are slack, then though the enemy be many we can close and fight. Where Wu Qi (吳起) broke a Qin host of five hundred thousand with five hundred chariots, and Xie Xuan (謝玄) drove off Fu Jian's million with eight thousand troops, what need was there to flee?

引兵避之也。

He leads his troops away and avoids them.

言不若者，勢力、交援俱不如也，則須速去之，不可遷延也。如敵人守我要害，發我津梁，合圍於我，則欲去，不復得也。

"No match" means that position and strength, alliances and relief all fall short; then one must leave quickly and must not delay. If the enemy holds our vital places, cuts our fords and bridges and surrounds us, then though we would leave we cannot leave any more.

引兵備之，強弱不敵，勢不相若，則引軍避，待利而動。

Lead the troops away and make ready. When strong and weak are not matched and the positions are not alike, lead the army away and avoid him, and wait for an advantage before moving.

勢力不如，則引而避。

When position and strength fall short, lead away and avoid him.

將與兵俱不若，遇敵攻，必敗也。

When both general and troops are the lesser, to meet the enemy and strike him is certain defeat.

兵力、謀勇皆劣於敵，則當引而避之，以伺其隙。

When the strength of the troops, the planning and the courage are all less than the enemy's, we should lead away and avoid him and watch for his opening.

小不能當大也。

The small cannot stand against the great.

小敵不量力而堅戰者，必爲大敵所擒也。漢都尉李陵以步卒五千之衆，對十萬之軍，而見殁匈奴也。

If a small enemy does not reckon his strength and insists on fighting, he is certain to be taken by the great one. Li Ling (李陵), a commandery commandant (都尉) of Han, faced a hundred thousand troops with five thousand foot soldiers and was broken by the Xiongnu (匈奴).

言堅者，將性堅忍，不能逃，不能避，故爲大者之所擒也。

To hold out stubbornly means that the general's nature is hard and enduring, so that he can neither flee nor avoid; and so he is taken by the greater side.

小不能當大也，言小國不量其力，敢與大邦爲讎，雖權時堅城固守，然後必見擒獲。《春秋傳》曰：「旣不能強，又不能弱，所以敗也。」

The small cannot stand against the great. It says that when a small state does not reckon its strength and dares to make an enemy of a great state, then though for a time it holds its walls firmly, afterward it is certain to be taken. The *Chunqiu* Commentary says, "It could not be strong, and it could not be weak either, and that is why it lost."

不逃、不避，雖堅亦擒。

If he neither flees nor avoids, then though he be stubborn he is taken all the same.

王晳《註》同梅堯臣。

Wang Xi's note is the same as Mei Yaochen's.

如右將軍蘇建、前將軍趙信將兵三千餘人，與大將軍衞青分行，獨逢單于兵數萬，力戰一日，漢兵且盡。前將軍信胡人，降爲翕侯；匈奴誘之，遂將其餘騎可八百餘奔降單于。右將軍蘇建遂盡亡其軍，獨以身得亡自歸。大將軍問其正閎、長史安、議郎周霸等，建爲云何？霸曰：「自大將軍出，未嘗斬一裨將。今建棄軍，可斬以明威重。」閎、安曰：「不然。《兵法》：『小敵之堅，大敵之擒也。』今建獨以數千當單于數萬，力戰一日，餘士盡不敢有二心，自歸而斬之，是示後人無歸意也。」

Su Jian (蘇建), General of the Right (右將軍), and Zhao Xin (趙信), General of the Van (前將軍), led some three thousand troops and parted ways from the General-in-Chief Wei Qing (衞靑); alone they met the Chanyu's (單于) several tens of thousands and fought hard for a day, until the Han troops were almost spent. Zhao Xin, the General of the Van, was a man of the barbarians who had surrendered and been made Marquis of Xi (翕侯); the Xiongnu enticed him, and in the end he led the eight hundred or so horsemen left to him, rode over and surrendered to the Chanyu. Su Jian, the General of the Right, lost his whole army at last and came back with nothing but his own body. The General-in-Chief asked the Rectifier (正) Hong (閎), the Chief Clerk (長史) An (安) and the Counselling Gentleman (議郎) Zhou Ba (周霸) and the others what should be done about Su Jian. Zhou Ba said, "Since the General-in-Chief came out, he has never beheaded even one subordinate general (裨將). Now that Su Jian has abandoned his army, he may well be beheaded to make plain the weight of your authority." Hong and An said, "It is not so. The *Art of War* (兵法) says, 'When the small side stubbornly holds out, it is taken captive by the great one.' Now Su Jian alone stood with a few thousand against the Chanyu's tens of thousands and fought hard for a day, and the troops left to him were none of them of two minds; if one beheads a man who came back of his own accord, this shows those who come after that they should have no thought of coming back."

小敵不度強弱而堅戰，必爲大敵之所擒，息侯屈於鄭伯，李陵降於匈奴是也。《孟子》曰：「小固不可以敵大，弱固不可以敵強，寡固不可以敵衆。」

If a small enemy does not reckon strong and weak and insists on fighting, he is certain to be taken by the great one. The Marquis of Xi (息侯) bending before the Earl of Zheng, and Li Ling surrendering to the Xiongnu, are such cases. The *Mengzi* (孟子) says, "The small cannot stand against the great, the weak cannot stand against the strong, and the few cannot stand against the many."

將周密，謀不泄也。

When the general leaves no gap, his plans do not leak.

輔，猶助也。將才足，則兵必強。

Fu (輔) is like helping. When the general's gifts are ample, the army is surely strong.

才周也。

It is that his gifts are complete all round.

國之強弱，必在於將。將輔於君而才周，其國則強；不輔於君，內懷其貳，則弱。擇人授任，不可不慎。

The strength or weakness of a state lies surely in its general. When the general supports his ruler and his gifts are complete all round, that state is strong; when he does not support his ruler and harbors two minds within, it is weak. One cannot but be careful in choosing the man to be entrusted.

周，謂才智具也。得才智周備之將，國乃安強也。

Zhou (周) means that gifts and wisdom are complete. When one gets a general whose gifts and wisdom are complete all round, the state is at once at peace and strong.

形見於外也。

What is within shows on the outside.

隙，缺也。將才不備，兵必弱。

Xi (隙) is what is missing. When the general's gifts are not complete, the army is surely weak.

才不周也。

It is that his gifts are not complete all round.

得賢則周備，失士則隙缺。

Get a worthy man and it is complete all round; lose your men of worth and a gap opens and something is missing.

周，謂將賢則忠才兼備；隙，謂有所缺也。

Zhou means that the general is worthy and has both loyalty and gifts, and xi means that there is something missing.

言其才不可不周，用事不可不周知也。故將在軍，必先知五事、六行、五權之用，與夫九變、四機之說，然後可以內御士衆，外料戰形；苟昧於茲，雖一日不可居三軍之上矣。

It says that his gifts cannot but be complete all round, and that he cannot but know all round in the handling of affairs. So a general with an army must first know the five matters, the six conducts and the use of the five powers (權), and the words of the nine changes (變) and the four moments (機); only then can he command the troops within and reckon the shape of battle without. If he is in the dark about these, he cannot stand over the three armies for even a day.

將謀周密，則敵不能窺，故其國強；微缺，則乘釁而入，故其國弱。太公曰：「得士者昌，失士者亡。」

When the general's planning is close all round, the enemy cannot spy into it, and so that state is strong; if there is even a little missing, the enemy rides through that gap and comes in, and so that state is weak. Taigong said, "He who gets men of worth flourishes; he who loses them perishes."

患君之所以不知。

It is a worry over what the ruler does not know.

已下語是。

It is what the words below say.

下三事也。

They are the three matters below.

縻，御也。

To hobble (縻) means to drive by the halter.

縻，絆也。不知進退者，軍必敗，如絆驥足，無馳騁也。楚將龍且逐韓信而敗，是不知其進；秦將苻融揮軍少却而敗，是不知其退。

Mi (縻) is to tie fast. If one does not know when to advance and when to fall back, the army is certain to lose; it is like tying the feet of a fine horse so that it cannot run. The Chu general Long Qie (龍且) chased Han Xin and lost, which was not knowing when to advance; the Qin general Fu Rong (苻融) signaled his troops to fall back a little and lost, which was not knowing when to fall back.

猶駕御縻絆，使不自由也。君，國君也。患於軍者，爲軍之患害也。夫授鉞凶門，推轂，閫外之事，將軍裁之。如趙充國欲爲屯田，漢宣必令決戰；孫皓臨滅，賈充尚請班師，此不知進退之謂也。

It is like driving a horse and tying it with the reins so that it cannot do as it will. Jun (君) is the ruler of the state. To be a worry to the army means to be the army's worry and harm. At the gate of ill omen (凶門) the axe is handed over and the chariot is pushed off, and what lies outside the gate the general reckons for himself. Zhao Chongguo (趙充國) wished to set up garrison farms (屯田) and Emperor Xuan (宣帝) of Han insisted on a decisive battle; Sun Hao had come to the point of ruin and Jia Chong (賈充) still asked that the troops be turned back. These speak of not knowing when to advance and when to fall back.

軍之進退，將可臨時制變，君命內御，患莫大焉。故太公曰：「國不可以從外治，軍不可以從中御。」

The advancing and falling back of an army must be held in hand by the general, who matches the moment and masters its changes; if the ruler's orders command it from within, there is no greater worry. That is why Taigong said, "A state cannot be governed from outside, and an army cannot be commanded from within."

縻，御也，靡爲反。君不知軍之形勢，而欲從中御也。故太公曰：「國不可以從外治，軍不可以從中御。」

Mi is to command, and the character is read by joining mi (靡) and wei (爲). It is the ruler not knowing the army's position and wishing to command it from within. That is why Taigong said, "A state cannot be governed from outside, and an army cannot be commanded from within."

君不知進退之宜，而專進退，是縻繫其軍，《六韜》所謂「軍不可以從中御」。

When the ruler does not know what is fitting in advancing and falling back and yet decides advance and retreat by himself, this is to tie his army fast; it is what the *Liutao* (六韜) means by "an army cannot be commanded from within."

縻，繫也。去此患，則當託以不御之權，故必忠才兼備之臣爲之將也。

Mi is to bind. To shake off this worry one should grant the authority of not being commanded, and so one must make a minister who has both loyalty and gifts the general.

軍未可以進，而必使之進；軍未可以退，而必使之退，是謂縻絆其軍也。故曰：進退由內御，則功難成。

To force an advance when the army cannot yet advance, and to force a retreat when the army cannot yet fall back, this is what is meant by tying the army fast. That is why it is said that when advance and retreat come out of command from within, it is hard to achieve anything.

「軍容不入國，國容不入軍」，禮不可以治兵也。

It is said, "The bearing of the army is not brought into the state, and the bearing of the state is not brought into the army"; so troops cannot be governed by the rules of ceremony.

任將不以其人也。燕將慕容評出軍，所在因山泉賣樵水，貪鄙積貨，爲三軍帥，不知其政也。

It is not setting the right man up as general. The Yan general Murong Ping (慕容評), wherever he took his troops, held the mountain springs and sold firewood and water, greedily piling up goods; he was general of the three armies and yet did not know their ordering.

蓋謂禮度法令，自有軍法從事，若使同於尋常治國之道，則軍士生惑矣。至如周亞夫見天子不拜，漢文知其勇不可犯；魏尚守雲中，上首級，爲有司所劾，馮唐所以發憤也。

As for rites and statutes, the army has a military law of its own and does its business by that; if it is done as in the ordinary way of governing a state, the soldiers are bewildered. Zhou Yafu did not bow when he saw the Son of Heaven, yet Emperor Wen of Han knew that his sharpness was not to be offended against; and Wei Shang (魏尙) held Yunzhong (雲中) and was impeached by the officials over the count of heads he reported, which is why Feng Tang (馮唐) was indignant.

「軍容不入國，國容不入軍」，禮不可以治兵也。夫治國尚禮義，兵貴於權詐，形勢各異，教化不同，而君不知其變，軍國一政，以用治民，則軍士疑惑，不知所措。故《兵經》曰：「在國以信，在軍以詐」也。

It is said, "The bearing of the army is not brought into the state, and the bearing of the state is not brought into the army," and so soldiers cannot be governed by rites. Governing a state holds rites and propriety high, while the army prizes meeting the moment and deceit; their positions each differ and their teachings are not the same. Yet if the ruler does not know how they differ, and makes army and state one single ordering and uses the law for governing the people, the soldiers doubt and are bewildered and do not know what to do. That is why the *Bingjing* (兵經) says, "In the state one acts by trust; in the army one acts by deceit."

言不知三軍之事，違衆沮議。《左傳》稱晉彘季不從軍師之謀，而以偏師先進，終爲楚之所敗也。

It speaks of not knowing the business of the three armies and yet going against the will of the many and blocking their counsel. The *Zuo Commentary* says that Zhi Ji (彘季) of Jin did not follow the plan of the army's counsellor (軍師) and went forward first with a single column of troops, and in the end was beaten by Chu.

不知治軍之務，而參其政，則衆惑亂也。曹公引《司馬法》曰「軍容不入國，國容不入軍」是也。

When one does not know the business of governing soldiers and yet meddles in their ordering, the many are bewildered and fall into disorder. This is what Lord Cao meant when he drew on the Sima fa and said, "The bearing of the army is not brought into the state, and the bearing of the state is not brought into the army."

軍、國異容，所治各殊。欲以治國之法以治軍旅，則軍旅惑亂。

Army and state differ in bearing, and what each governs differs too. If one would govern soldiers by the law for governing a state, the soldiers are bewildered and fall into disorder.

仁義可以治國，而不可以治軍；權變可以治軍，而不可以治國，理然也。虢公不修慈愛，而爲晉所滅；晉侯不守四德，而爲秦所克，是不以仁義治國也。齊侯不射君子，而敗於晉；宋公不擒二毛，而衂於楚，是不以權變治軍也。故當仁義而用權譎，則國必危，晉虢是也；當變詐而尚禮義，則兵必敗，齊宋是也。然則治國之道，固不可以治軍也。

With benevolence and rightness a state can be governed but an army cannot, and by meeting the moment an army can be governed but a state cannot; such is the principle. The Duke of Guo (虢公) did not cultivate love and was destroyed by Jin, and the Marquis of Jin did not keep the four virtues and was broken by Qin; this is not governing a state with benevolence and rightness. The Marquis of Qi (齊侯) would not shoot a gentleman and was beaten by Jin, and the Duke of Song (宋公) would not take a grizzled old man captive and was broken by Chu; this is not governing an army by meeting the moment. So where benevolence and rightness ought to be used, if deceit is used the state is surely in danger, as with Jin and Guo; and where meeting the moment ought to be used, if rites and propriety are held high the army is surely beaten, as with Qi and Song. Then indeed soldiers cannot be governed by the way of governing a state.

不得其人也。

It is giving the charge to one who is not the man for it.

謂將無權智，不能銓度軍士，各任所長，而雷同使之，不盡其材，則三軍生疑矣。黃石公曰：「善任人者，使智、使勇、使貪、使愚，智者樂立其功，勇者好行其志，貪者邀趨其利，愚者不顧其死。」

When a general has no wisdom for meeting the moment, and cannot sort and weigh his soldiers and entrust to each what he is good at, but uses them all alike and so does not use their gifts to the full, the three armies grow doubtful. Huang Shigong (黃石公) said, "One who uses men well uses the clever, uses the quick, uses the greedy and uses the foolish. The clever delight in making their own merit; the quick love to stretch out their will; the greedy run after gain; and the foolish take no care for their own death."

將在軍，權不專制，任不自由，三軍之士自然疑也。

When a general is with the army and cannot hold the authority alone, and cannot handle what is entrusted to him as he sees fit, the soldiers of the three armies doubt of their own accord.

不得其人也。君之任將，當精擇焉。將若不知權變，不可付以勢位。苟授非其人，則舉措失所，軍覆敗也。若趙不用廣武君而用成安君。

It is not getting the right man. When a ruler entrusts a generalship, he ought to choose with care. If a general does not know how to meet the moment, power and position cannot be entrusted to him. If they are given to an unfit man, then in everything he does he loses his footing, and the army is overturned and beaten. It is like Zhao not using the Lord of Guangwu but using the Lord of Cheng'an.

不知權謀之道，而參其任用，則衆疑貳也。

When one does not know the way of meeting the moment and yet meddles in its use, the many doubt and harbor two minds.

政也，權也，使不知者同之，則動有違異，必相牽制也，是則軍衆疑惑矣。裴度所以奏去監軍平蔡州也，此皆由君上不能專任賢將，則使同之，故通謂之三患。

So it is with the ordering, and so with meeting the moment: if one who does not know is made to share in handling them, every move goes awry and they are bound to pull against and block one another, and then the soldiers doubt and are bewildered. That is why Pei Du (裴度) pacified Caizhou (蔡州) only after he had petitioned to do away with the army inspector (監軍, an official sent to watch over the army). All of this comes of the ruler not entrusting a worthy general alone but making him share the handling with another, and so these are together called the three worries.

不知用兵權謀之人，用之爲將，則軍不治而士疑。

If a man who does not know how to meet the moment in the use of troops is made general, the army is not well ordered and the soldiers doubt.

軍吏中有不知兵家權謀之人，而使同居將帥之任，則政令不一，而軍疑矣。若邲之戰，中軍帥荀林父欲還，裨將先縠不從，爲楚所敗是也。近世以中官監軍，其患正如此。高崇文伐蜀，因罷之，遂能成功。

If among the army's officers (軍吏) a man who does not know the soldier's way of meeting the moment is seated together with the general in his charge, then ordering and command are not of one piece and the soldiers doubt. It is like the battle of Bi (邲), where Xun Linfu (荀林父), the general of the central army, wished to turn back but his subordinate Xian Hu (先縠) would not follow, and they were beaten by Chu. In our own day the making of eunuchs into army inspectors brings a worry of just this kind. When Gao Chongwen (高崇文) attacked Shu, it was only after he had done away with it that he finally achieved anything.

引，奪也。

Handing away (引) means being robbed of it.

引，奪也。兵，權道也，不可謬而使處。趙上卿藺相如言趙括徒能讀其父書，然未知合變，王今以名使括，如膠柱鼓瑟。此則「不知三軍之權，而同三軍之任」。趙王不從，果有長平之敗，諸侯之難至也。

Yin (引) means to have something taken away. The army is a way of meeting the moment, and the wrong man must not be set in that place. Lin Xiangru (藺相如), the chief minister of Zhao, said, "Zhao Kuo (趙括) has only read his father's writings and does not know how to match the changes; now Your Majesty looks only at the name and uses Zhao Kuo, which is like gluing the pegs fast and then playing the lute." This is precisely "not knowing how the three armies shift with the moment and yet sharing in their command." The king of Zhao did not listen, and sure enough there came the defeat at Changping (長平); trouble from the other lords had arrived.

言我軍疑惑，自致擾亂，如引敵人使勝我也。

It says that our troops doubt and are bewildered and so call up disorder of themselves, which is like drawing the enemy in and letting him beat us.

三軍之衆，疑其所任，惑其所爲，則鄰國諸侯因其乖錯，作難而至也。太公曰：「疑志不可以應敵。」

When the host of the three armies doubts what has been entrusted to it and is bewildered about what it is doing, the lords of the neighboring states take advantage of the breach and raise trouble that comes down upon it. Taigong said, "When the will is in doubt, the enemy cannot be met."

君徒知制其將，不能用其人，而乃同其政、任，俾衆疑惑，故諸侯之難作，是自亂其軍，自去其勝。

The ruler knows only how to hold down and manage his own general and does not use the man properly, and by sharing in the ordering and the command he makes the many doubtful and bewildered; and so trouble from the other lords arises. This is to throw one's own army into confusion and to cast away one's own victory.

引諸侯勝己也。

It is drawing the other lords in and letting them beat oneself.

士疑惑而無畏則亂，故敵國得以乘我隙釁而至矣。

When soldiers doubt and are bewildered and have nothing they stand in awe of, they fall into disorder; and so an enemy state can take advantage of our gaps and flaws and come down upon us.

軍士疑惑，未肯用命，則諸侯之兵乘隙而至，是自潰其軍，自奪其勝也。

When soldiers doubt and are bewildered and will not follow orders, the troops of the other lords take advantage of the breach and come down upon us; this is to bring down one's own army oneself and to have one's own victory taken away.

謂下五事也。

He means the five things below.

下五事也。

These are the five matters below.

料人事逆順，然後以《太一遁甲》算三門遇奇五將無關格，迫脅主客之計者，必勝也。

One measures whether the affairs of men run against him or with him, and then reckons by the *Taiyi dunjia* (太一遁甲) whether the Three Gates (三門) meet the unorthodox (奇) and whether the five generals are free of blockage (關格); he who drives and presses the plans of host and guest will surely win.

下文所謂「知彼知己」是也。

What the text below calls "knowing the other and knowing oneself" is this.

能料知敵情，審其虛實者勝也。

He who measures and knows the enemy's true state and examines his emptiness and fullness wins.

知可不可之宜。

It is to know what is fitting, whether a thing may be done or may not.

可則進，否則止，保勝之道也。

If it may be done he advances, and if not he stops; this is the way of keeping victory.

審己與敵。

It is to examine myself and the enemy.

可戰則進攻，不可戰則退守；能審攻守之宜，則無不勝。

If he can fight he advances and strikes; if he cannot fight he withdraws and holds. He who can examine what is fitting in striking and in holding will not fail to win.

量力也。

This is to measure strength.

先知敵之衆寡，然後起兵以應之，如王翦伐荊，曰「非六十萬不可」是也。

One first knows whether the enemy is many or few and then raises troops to stand against him. When Wang Jian (王翦) struck Jing (荊) and said, "Nothing less than six hundred thousand will do," this is it.

言兵之形，有衆而不可擊寡，或可以弱制強，而能變之者勝也，故《春秋傳》曰「師克在和，不在衆」是也。

This says that in the conformation of armies there are times when the numbers are many and yet cannot strike the few, and times when the weak press down the strong; he who knows how to change and use them wins. So the *Spring and Autumn Commentary* says, "An army's winning lies in concord, not in numbers." This is it.

量力而動。

He measures his strength and moves.

謂我對敵兵之衆寡，圍、攻、分、戰是也。

This says that when I stand against the enemy's troops I ring them about, strike them, divide them and fight them according as they are many or few.

用兵之法，有以少而勝衆者，有以多而勝寡者，在乎度其所用，而不失其宜則善，如《吳子》所謂「用衆者務易，用少者務隘」是也。

In the law of using troops there is beating the many with the few and beating the few with the many; it is good to measure their use and not lose what is fitting. What the *Wuzi* calls "he who uses many troops works in open ground, and he who uses few works in narrow ground" is this.

君臣同欲。

Ruler and minister want the same thing.

觀士卒心，上下同欲，如報私仇者勝。

He examines the heart of his troops; if high and low want the same thing, as though each were avenging his own private enemy, he wins.

言上下共同其利欲，則三軍無怨，敵可勝也。《傳》曰「以欲從人則可，以人從欲鮮濟」也。

This says that when high and low share their gains and their wishes there is no resentment in the three armies, and the enemy can be beaten. The *Zuo Commentary* says, "To bring my wish round to another will do; to bring another round to my wish seldom brings a thing to pass."

言君臣和同，勇而戰者勝。故《孟子》曰：「天時不如地利，地利不如人和。」

This says that he wins whose ruler and ministers are in concord and one and who fight with dash. So the *Mencius* says, "The seasons of Heaven are not equal to the advantages of Earth, and the advantages of Earth are not equal to the concord of men."

心齊一也。

Their hearts are made even and one.

上下一心。若先縠剛愎以取敗，呂布違異以致亡，皆上下不同欲之所致。

High and low are of one heart. Xian Hu bringing on defeat by his stubbornness and fierceness, and Lü Bu coming to ruin by his crookedness, were both because high and low did not want the same thing.

《書》云：「受有億兆夷人，離心離德；予有亂臣十人，同心同德。」商滅而周興。

The *Book of Documents* says, "Shou (受) has myriads upon myriads of men, but their hearts are divided and their virtue is divided; I have ten ministers who govern, and their hearts are the same and their virtue is the same." Shang (商) fell and Zhou rose.

百將一心，三軍同力，人人欲戰，則所向無前矣。

When every general is of one heart and the three armies join their strength, so that every man wishes to fight, there is none who can stand before them where they turn.

有備預也。

It is to have made ready beforehand.

虞，度也。《左傳》曰「不備不虞，不可以師」，待敵之可勝也。

Yu (虞) means to reckon. The *Zuo Commentary* says, "Without making ready and without reckoning one cannot handle troops"; it is to wait for the time when the enemy can be beaten.

謂先爲不可勝之師，待敵之可勝也。

This says that one first becomes an army that cannot be beaten and waits for the time when the enemy can be beaten.

虞，度也。以我有法度之師，擊彼無法度之兵。故《春秋傳》曰「不備不虞，不可以師」是也。

Yu means to reckon. It is to strike with my troops, which have measure, the troops of the other side, which have none. So the *Spring and Autumn Commentary* says, "Without making ready and without reckoning one cannot handle troops." This is it.

慎備非常。

It is to prepare with care against the unlooked for.

以我之虞，待敵之不虞也。

It is with my own reckoning to wait upon the enemy's failure to reckon.

春秋時，城濮之役，晉無楚備，以敗於邲。邲之後，楚無晉備，以敗於鄢。自鄢已來，晉不失備，而加之以禮，重之以睦，是以楚弗能加晉。又周末，荊人伐陳，吳救之，軍行三十里，雨十日夜，不見星。左史倚相謂大將子期曰：「雨十日夜，甲輯兵聚，吳人必至，不如備之。」乃爲陳。而吳人至，見荊有備而反。左史曰：「其反覆六十里，其君子休，小人爲食；我行三十里，擊之必克。」從之，遂破吳軍。魏大將軍南征吳，到積湖。魏將滿寵帥諸軍在前，與敵隔水相對。寵令諸將曰：「今夕風甚猛，賊必來燒營，宜豫爲之備。」諸軍皆警。夜半，賊果遣十部來燒營，寵掩擊破之。又，春秋衞人以燕師伐鄭，鄭祭足、原繁、洩駕以三軍軍其前，使曼伯與子元潛軍軍其後。燕人畏鄭三軍，而不虞制人。六月，鄭二公子以制人敗燕師於北制。君子曰：「不備不虞，不可以師。」又，楚子重自陳伐莒，圍渠丘。渠丘城惡，衆潰奔莒，楚入渠丘。莒人囚楚公子平。楚人曰：「勿殺，吾歸而俘。」莒人殺之，楚師圍莒，莒城亦惡。庚申，莒潰，楚遂入鄆。莒無備故也。君子曰：「恃陋而不備，罪之大者也；備豫不虞，善之大者也。」莒恃其陋而不修城郭，浹辰之間，而楚克其三都，無備也夫！

In the Spring and Autumn time, after the battle of Chengpu (城濮) Jin had no preparation against Chu and was beaten at Bi; and after the battle of Bi, Chu had no preparation against Jin and was beaten at Yan (鄢). After the battle of Yan, Jin did not lose its preparation but added rite to it and made its concord thick, and so Chu could do nothing against Jin. Again, at the end of the Zhou, when the men of Chu struck Chen and Wu came to the rescue, the army went thirty li while the rain fell ten days and nights so that no star could be seen. The recorder of the left, Yi Xiang (倚相), said to the great general Ziqi (子期), "The rain has fallen ten days and nights, so they have gathered in their armor and drawn their troops together; the men of Wu will surely come. It is best to make ready." At this he set his line. The men of Wu came, saw that Chu was ready, and went back. The recorder of the left said, "They have walked sixty li coming and going, so their officers are resting and their men are cooking. We have gone only thirty li; strike, and we shall surely win." They followed his words and broke the army of Wu at last. The great general of Wei struck Wu southward and came to Jihu (積湖). Man Chong (滿寵), a general of Wei, was in front with the several armies, facing the enemy across the water. Man Chong gave command to his generals, saying, "This evening the wind is very fierce, and the enemy will surely come and burn our camp. We must make ready beforehand." So all the armies were on their guard. In the middle of the night the enemy did indeed send ten companies to burn the camp, and Man Chong fell upon them and broke them. Again, in the Spring and Autumn time the men of Wei (衞) took the army of Yan with them and struck Zheng. Zhai Zu (祭足), Yuan Fan (原繁) and Xie Jia (洩駕) of Zheng set their line before them with the three armies, and had Manbo (曼伯) and Ziyuan (子元) hide troops behind them. The men of Yan feared the three armies of Zheng but did not reckon the men of Zhi (制). In the sixth month the two princes of Zheng broke the army of Yan at Beizhi (北制) with the men of Zhi. A gentleman said, "Without making ready and without reckoning one cannot handle troops." Again, Zizhong (子重) of Chu struck Ju (莒) from Chen and ringed Quqiu (渠丘). The walls of Quqiu were in disrepair, so the host crumbled and fled to Ju, and Chu entered Quqiu. The men of Ju shut up Ping (平), a prince of Chu, and the men of Chu said, "Do not kill him; we shall send back the man we have taken." But the men of Ju killed him. The army of Chu ringed Ju, and the walls of Ju too were in disrepair. On the day gengshen Ju crumbled and Chu entered Yun (鄆) at last; it was because Ju had made no preparation. A gentleman said, "To trust in disrepair and not make ready is a great crime; to make ready beforehand against what cannot be reckoned is a great good." Ju trusted in its disrepair and did not mend its walls, and in twelve days Chu struck and took three of its towns; it was without preparation.

常爲不可勝以待敵，故吳起曰：「出門如見敵。」士季曰：「有備不敗。」

He always makes himself into a shape the enemy cannot beat and so waits for the enemy. Therefore Wu Qi said, "When you go out the gate, be as though you saw the enemy," and Shi Ji (士季) said, "He who has made ready is not beaten."

《司馬法》曰「進退惟時，無曰寡人」也。

The Sima fa (司馬法) says, "Advance and retreat rest on the moment alone; let the ruler not say do this or do that."

將在外，君命有所不受者勝，真將軍也。吳伐楚，吳公子光弟夫槩王至，請擊楚子常，不許。夫槩曰：「所謂見義而行，不待命也。今日我死，楚可入也。」以其屬五千，先擊子常，敗之。審此，則將能而君不能御也。晉宣帝拒諸葛於五丈原，天子使辛毗仗節軍門，曰：「敢問戰者，斬！」亮聞，笑曰：「苟能制吾，豈千里請戰？」假言天子不許，示武於衆，此是不能之將。

When a general is in the field there are commands of his ruler that he does not receive; such a one wins, and he is a true general. When Wu struck Chu, Fugai Wang (夫槩王), the younger brother of Guang (光), a prince of Wu, came and asked leave to strike Zichang (子常) of Chu, but it was not granted. Fugai said, "This is what is called seeing the right and doing it without waiting for a command. Though I die today, I can enter Chu," and with his own five thousand men he struck Zichang first and broke him. Look at this, and one knows that when a general is able the ruler cannot tie his hands. When Emperor Xuan of Jin blocked Zhuge Liang (諸葛亮) at the Wuzhang Plain (五丈原), the Son of Heaven sent Xin Pi (辛毗) to stand at the gate of the camp holding the tally and say, "Whoever dares speak of giving battle will be beheaded." Zhuge Liang heard it and laughed, saying, "If he could truly hold me down, why would he beg for battle from a thousand li away?" He made the Son of Heaven's refusal his excuse and played the firm man before his host; this is a general who is not able.

《尉繚子》曰：「夫將者，上不制乎天，下不制乎地，中不制乎人。故兵者，凶器也；將者，死官也。」

The *Weiliaozi* says, "A general is not tied to Heaven above, nor to Earth below, nor to men in between. Therefore arms are an ill-omened vessel and the general is an officer charged with death."

《司馬法》曰：「進退唯時，無曰寡人。」將旣精能，曉練兵勢，君能專任，事不從中御。故王子曰「指授在君，決戰在將」也。

The *Sima fa* says, "Advancing and withdrawing follow the time alone, and the ruler is not invoked." The general is already fine and able and clear about the conformation of armies, and the ruler entrusts all to him and does not work the matter from the court. So the Prince (王子) said, "Pointing out and telling rest with the ruler; deciding the battle rests with the general."

自閫以外，將軍制之。

What lies outside the city gate the general takes in charge and orders.

君御能將者，不能絶疑忌耳。若賢明之主，必能知人，固當委任以責成効，推轂授鉞，是其義也。攻戰之事，一以專之，不從中御，所以一威，且盡其才也。況臨敵乘機，間不容髮，安可遙制之乎？

That a ruler ties the hands of an able general is only because he cannot cut off doubt and misgiving. A worthy and clear-sighted ruler is sure to know his man, to entrust the matter to him as is fitting and hold him answerable for success; pushing his chariot and handing him the axe is that meaning. In striking and fighting all is entrusted to him alone and not worked from the court; this is why the awe is made one and his talent is used to the full. How much more in facing the enemy and riding upon a gap, where not a hair's breadth can enter: how could it be worked from afar?

古者，遣將於太廟，親操鉞，持其首，授其柄，曰：「從是以上至天者，將軍制之。」乃復操柄，授與刃，曰：「從是以下至淵者，將軍制之。」故李牧之爲趙將，居邊，軍市之租，皆自用饗士，賞賜決於外，不從中御也。周亞夫之軍細柳，軍中唯聞將軍之命，不聞天子之詔也。蓋用兵之法，一步百變，見可而進，知難而退。而曰︰有王命焉，是白大人以救火也，未及反命，而煨燼久矣！曰：有監軍焉，是作舍道邊也，謀無適從，而終不可成矣！故御能將而責平猾虜者，如絆韓盧而求獲狡免者，又何異焉？

Of old, when a general was sent out from the great shrine, the ruler himself took the axe, held it by the head and handed him the haft, saying, "From here upward to Heaven, let the general take it in charge and order it"; then he held the haft and handed him the blade, saying, "From here downward to the deeps, let the general take it in charge and order it." Therefore when Li Mu (李牧) was a general of Zhao and was at the frontier, he used all the market taxes of the camp himself to feed his troops and decided rewards in the field; the court did not work it. When Zhou Yafu set his camp at Xiliu (細柳), in the camp they heard only the general's commands and not the Son of Heaven's edict. In general, the law of using troops changes a hundred times in a single step: seeing what may be done one advances, and knowing the hardship one withdraws. Yet if it is said that one must have the ruler's command, this is like asking one's elders when putting out a fire: before the word has gone and come back, all has long been burned to ash. And if it is said that there is an army inspector, this is like building a house by the roadside, where the plan has nothing to follow and nothing is brought to pass in the end. Therefore to tie the hands of an able general and press him to put down a crafty barbarian — how does it differ from binding the feet of Han Lu (韓盧) and bidding him catch a crafty hare?

將有智勇之能，則當任以責成功，不可從中御也。故曰：「閫外之事，將軍裁之。」

If the general has the talent of wisdom and dash, the matter should be entrusted to him and he should be held answerable for success; it must not be worked from the court. So it is said, "What lies outside the city gate the general cuts and shapes."

此上五事也。

These are the five matters above.

量力而拒敵，有何危殆乎？

He measures his strength and blocks the enemy; what danger could there be?

以我之政，料敵之政；以我之將，料敵之將；以我之衆，料敵之衆；以我之食，料敵之食；以我之地，料敵之地。校量已定，優劣短長皆先見之，然後兵起，故有百戰百勝也。

I measure the enemy's government by my own, the enemy's general by my own, the enemy's troops by my own, the enemy's provisions by my own, the enemy's ground by my own. When the setting side by side and measuring is already settled and better and worse, longer and shorter have all been seen first, only then are troops raised; and so there is winning a hundred times in a hundred fights.

審知彼己強弱、利害之勢，雖百戰實無危殆也。

If one examines and knows the hard and the weak in him and in me and the conformation of what is to our profit and our harm, then in a hundred fights there is truly no danger.

彼己五者盡知之，故無敗。

He knows all five things in him and in me, and so there is no defeat.

殆，危也。謂校盡彼我之情，知勝而後戰，則百戰不危。

Dai (殆) means to be in danger. This says that when one has set the true state of him and of me side by side without remainder and knows that one will win, and only then fights, in a hundred fights one is not in danger.

知彼知己者，攻守之謂也。知彼則可以攻，知己則可以守。攻是守之機，守是攻之策。苟能知之，雖百戰不危也。或曰：士會察楚師之不可敵，陳平料劉、項之長短，是知彼知己也。

Knowing the other and knowing oneself speaks of striking and holding. Know the other and one can strike; know oneself and one can hold. Striking is the hinge of holding, and holding is the ground of striking. If one can truly know this, then in a hundred fights one is not in danger. Some say that Shi Hui examining that the army of Chu could not be stood against, and Chen Ping (陳平) measuring the long and the short of Liu Bang and Xiang Yu, were knowing the other and knowing oneself.

自以己強，而不料敵，則勝負未定。秦主苻堅以百萬之衆南伐，或謂曰：「彼有人焉，謝安、桓沖，江表偉才，不可輕之。」堅曰：「我以八州之衆，士馬百萬，投鞭可斷江水，何難之有？」後果敗績，則其義也。

He who holds himself hard and does not measure the enemy has not yet settled his winning or losing. When Fu Jian, the ruler of Qin, struck the south with a host of a million, someone said, "The other side too has men. Xie An (謝安) and Huan Chong (桓沖) are great talents of the land south of the river and must not be made light of." Fu Jian said, "I have the host of eight provinces and a million horse and foot; I can throw in my whips and dam the river. What hardship is there?" Afterwards he was indeed beaten; this is just that meaning.

恃我之強，不知敵不可伐者，一勝一負。王猛將終，諫苻堅曰：「晉氏雖在江表，而正朔所禀；謝安、桓沖，江表偉人，不可伐也。」及堅南伐，曰：「吾士馬百萬，投鞭可濟。」遂有淝水之敗也。

He who trusts only in his own hardness and does not know that the enemy must not be struck wins once and loses once. When Wang Meng (王猛) was dying he admonished Fu Jian, saying, "Though Jin is south of the river, it holds the true succession; and Xie An and Huan Chong are great men of the land south of the river. It must not be struck." When Fu Jian struck the south he said, "My horse and foot are a million; I can throw in my whips and cross the river" — and in the end came the defeat at the Fei River.

杜說乃是出兵無名，而伐無罪，所以敗也，非「一勝一負」之義。

Du Mu's words are about sending out troops without a name and striking the guiltless, which is why he was beaten; they are not the meaning of "winning one and losing one."

雖不知敵之形勢，恃己能克之者，勝負各半。

He who does not know the enemy's conformation and yet trusts that he himself can win is half winning and half losing.

自知己者，勝負半也。

He who knows only himself is half winning and half losing.

但能計己，不知敵之強弱，則或勝或負。

If one can measure only one's own side and does not know the hard and the weak in the enemy, one sometimes wins and sometimes loses.

唐太宗曰：「今之將臣，雖未能知彼，苟能知己，則安有不利乎？」所謂知己者，守吾氣而有待焉者也。故知守而不知攻，則勝負之半。

Taizong of the Tang said, "If the generals of these days cannot know the other but can truly know themselves, how should there be anything that is not to their profit?" What is called knowing oneself is to keep one's own spirit and wait for the time. Therefore if one knows only how to hold and not how to strike, it is half winning and half losing.

是謂狂宼，不敗何待也？

Such a one is called a mad bandit; what should he wait for but defeat?

外不料敵，內不知己，用戰必殆。

He who cannot measure the enemy without and does not know himself within will surely be in danger when he comes to battle.

一不知，何以勝？

If he does not know even one of them, by what shall he win?

全昧於計也。

He is utterly dark in his reckoning.

攻守之術皆不知，以戰則敗。

He knows neither the skill of striking nor that of holding; fighting with these, he loses.