Yetgeul › Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) › Book 3 — The Geunpok Collection

Enemy Strength in Gyeongsang, and Sending Kim Eung-seo and Yi Si-eon陳慶尙道賊勢請以金應瑞爲別將留駐大丘又請促忠淸兵使李時言往慶尙道與諸將同力捕賊。啓

Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) 懲毖錄 · Ryu Seong-ryong · 1633 (printed; written after the Imjin War) · 1 passages · 1,202 Chinese characters · reading time 9.7 min

Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) Book 3 — The Geunpok Collection A record left by Ryu Seong-ryong, Chief State Councillor, of what he saw with his own eyes after the Imjin War ended. Its title comes from the line, "I rebuke what is past, and take heed against troubles to come." He set down without excuse how the war began and what the court failed to do. His recommendation of Yi Sun-sin, the wrangling with the Ming army, and the suffering the people endured are all recorded as they were.

臣頃在慶尙道目見本道事勢十分危迫而右道之勢尤急謹以一二愚見妄爲狀啓此外未盡之意欲於復。命時。啓達而臣病劇疲困未卽書啓近日伏見都元帥權慄及防禦使權應銖等狀啓右道之賊已踰洛東江下流自靈山昌寧玄風密陽淸道晝夜散掠已及大丘慶山之境都元帥亦不能駐在大丘是其中道皆爲賊藪幸而蔚山之賊觀望未動若一時俱動則左右道淪陷之勢將不遠臣竊料本道乃國之門戶府庫如使鳥嶺以南盡爲賊有則江原忠淸全羅次第瓦解而大事去矣臣念及此事爲之夜不能寐臨飡忘食臣觀右道出沒之賊與前日賊勢不同前則賊兵必大張旗幟多數出來故我國之民或隱匿山谷以避鋒刃賊去則還爲聚集略事耕作以度朝夕今則賊或什伍成群或數百爲運變着我國人衣服使被擄之人前導橫行晝伏夜行潜相掩襲故雖幽深山谷無處不到人民不能躱避盡罹於鋒刃不然則皆爲被擄而去安有如此寒心之事乎我國將官等不能瞭望體探賊來而不知賊去而不知從前如此而今則道內空虛尤甚左右道相距數百里間只有成允文鄭起龍以些少軍兵把截兩道中間一帶空虛尤甚但有防禦使權應銖在慶山東奔西馳難望䇿應前日請於大丘置陣以通左右道氣脈者爲是故也見在諸將中惟郭再祐金應瑞可堪此任今聞再祐一陣不起云如此遷延而賊勢日熾則事無及矣金應瑞雖在白衣從軍之中而近日蔚山之役略有微勞且其所率降倭皆是力戰之卒若令金應瑞專當大丘而與權應銖連勢且令密陽府使李英等收拾密陽靈山淸道玄風昌寧等處之兵略成軍形以爲討賊收拾地方之計則事雖已晚猶可及圖也臣來時金應瑞牒呈于臣云在此別無所爲事且其率領降倭亦無得食資活之路願以軍官隨行於臣處云蓋其意自以客將寄寓道內事勢難便故如此云云此人旣以罪令從軍責效雖不可遽授將任但以中路別將之名使之留在其處添其軍數又除出大丘所在粮餉以爲軍粮使降倭等不至缺望而力於戰鬪似爲宜當且蔚山之戰降倭等多有立功者而久不行賞此屬皆不能無怨幷令軍功廳查覈論賞慰諭分給激勵其心亦係權時之宜也且忠淸兵使李時言遷延時日尙未下去云極爲未便臣在慶尙道時忠淸監司金信元移牒於臣云調兵勢難且本道亦不可無主將李時言不當更赴南方云云臣答以慶尙右道賊勢如此若右道不保則次第將及於忠淸道速爲下送云云今見都元帥權慄狀啓則李時言以軍粮不辦尙未前進云軍粮鳥嶺等處亦不無餘儲尙州星州大丘皆有軍粮軍到其處自可就食教急之兵當倍道幷行今乃遲延引日以失事機甚可惜也此亦當自。朝廷嚴辭峻責使之到日馳赴先下大丘與金應瑞權應銖等合勢驅逐其處賊勢稍退則金應瑞權應銖雖留在信地而李時言則移軍右連更與鄭起龍勦捕右道之賊勢不可已大扺春節已深而賊勢如此人民盡散地方空虛之後雖欲築城屯田以爲經遠之圖誰與爲之此賊兇計萬端其連營屯結之處自蔚山至順天九百餘里更有巨濟南海爲其巢穴土地膏腴甲於南方今使零賊出沒分掠於數百里之間盡驅我國遺在之民使不得耕種其處而海邊一帶招集被擄之徒蜂屯蟻聚肆意屯耕仍於要害處據險築城首尾連絡他日雖欲以數萬兵甲取之其勢極難故今日之事當在於早决不在於持久臣病中精神昏耗未能細陳曲折而大槪如此伏乞。下備邊司商度施行如何

When your servant was lately in Gyeongsang Province, he saw with his own eyes how utterly perilous and pressing the state of that province is, and the condition of the Right Province (右道) was the more urgent. He humbly and presumptuously sent up one or two foolish views in a field report, and the rest of what he had not fully said he meant to report when he returned to render his account; but your servant's illness was severe and he was worn out, and so he could not report it in writing at once.

Of late, looking humbly at the field reports of the Supreme Commander Gwon Yul (權慄) and the Defense Commander Gwon Eung-su (權應銖) and others, the enemy of the Right Province have already crossed the lower reaches of the Nakdong River and have spread out plundering day and night from Yeongsan, Changnyeong, Hyeonpung, Miryang, and Cheongdo, and have already reached the borders of Daegu and Gyeongsan, so that even the Supreme Commander cannot stay at Daegu. This means that the middle road has wholly become the enemy's lair. Happily the enemy at Ulsan are watching and have not stirred; but if they should all move at once, the condition in which the Left Province and the Right Province are swallowed up would not be far off.

Your servant reckons quietly that this province is the gateway and the granary of the country. If all south of Joryeong becomes the enemy's, then Gangwon, Chungcheong, and Jeolla will fall in turn and the great business will be lost. When your servant's thoughts reach this point he cannot sleep at night, and he sits before his table and forgets to eat.

As your servant sees it, the enemy who come and go in the Right Province are not as the enemy was in former days. Formerly the enemy soldiers always came out with their banners spread wide and in great numbers, so that our people could hide in the mountain valleys and escape the blade, and when the enemy had gone they gathered again and tilled their fields after a fashion and got through from morning to evening. Now the enemy band together sometimes by tens and fives, sometimes several hundred in a single company; they change into the clothing of our country's people, drive captives before them as guides, and go about as they please. They lie hidden by day and move by night and fall upon us stealthily, so that there is no place they do not reach, however deep the mountain valley; the people cannot escape and all fall to the blade, and those who do not are all carried off captive. How can there be a thing so pitiable as this?

Our generals cannot keep watch or scout, and so they do not know when the enemy comes nor when the enemy goes. It has been so from before, but now the emptiness within the province is worse still. In the several hundred li that lie between the Left Province and the Right Province, only Seong Yun-mun (成允文) and Jeong Gi-ryong (鄭起龍) stand in the way with a handful of soldiers, and the one belt in the middle of the two provinces is emptier still. Only the Defense Commander Gwon Eung-su is at Gyeongsan, running east and running west, so that concerted support (策應) is hardly to be hoped for. This is why your servant asked before that a camp be placed at Daegu to let the breath and the pulse of the Left and the Right Provinces pass between them.

Among the generals now in place, only Gwak Jae-u (郭再祐) and Kim Eung-seo (金應瑞) are equal to this charge. Now we hear that Gwak Jae-u's one camp has not yet been raised. If it is drawn out like this and the enemy's strength grows day by day, matters will be past remedy.

Kim Eung-seo, though he is serving in the ranks stripped of office, had some small merit in the recent fighting at Ulsan, and the surrendered Japanese (降倭) under him are all soldiers who fight hard. If Kim Eung-seo were given sole charge of Daegu so as to join his position to that of Gwon Eung-su, and if the magistrate of Miryang, Yi Yeong (李英), and others were made to gather up the soldiers of Miryang, Yeongsan, Cheongdo, Hyeonpung, Changnyeong, and those parts and bring them into some shape of an army, and so make a plan for striking the enemy and recovering the country, then, late though the business already is, it may yet be contrived.

When your servant was coming away, Kim Eung-seo sent him a written submission (牒呈) saying, "There is nothing in particular for me to do here, and I have no means of feeding the surrendered Japanese under me; I wish to follow your servant's quarters as a military officer." His meaning in general was that, being a guest general (客將) attached within the province, he felt his position uneasy, and so he spoke thus. Since this man is already serving in the army for an offense and is charged with making good by merit, he cannot suddenly be given the charge of a general; but it seems fitting that he be kept there under the title of Detached Commander of the Middle Road (中路別將), that his number of soldiers be increased, and that a part of the military grain at Daegu be set aside for his provisions, so that the surrendered Japanese may not lose what they looked for and may give their strength to the fighting.

Further, many of the surrendered Japanese won merit in the fighting at Ulsan, yet no reward has been given these many days, and this company cannot but all be resentful. It is also a fitting thing for the time that the Office of Military Merit (軍功廳) be made to look into it, assign rewards, and comfort them with distributions, so as to hearten them.

Again, the Provincial Army Commander of Chungcheong, Yi Si-eon (李時言), is said to be dragging out the days and has not yet gone down, which is altogether improper. When your servant was in Gyeongsang Province, the Governor of Chungcheong, Kim Sin-won (金信元), sent him a dispatch (移文) saying, "It is hard to levy soldiers, and this province too cannot be without a chief general (主將), so it is not fitting that Yi Si-eon go south again." Your servant answered, "Such is the enemy's strength in the Right Province of Gyeongsang that if the Right Province cannot be held it will reach Chungcheong in its turn; send him down quickly."

Now, looking at the field report of the Supreme Commander Gwon Yul, Yi Si-eon has not yet advanced because he could not provide military grain. But grain is not wanting at Joryeong and those parts, and there is grain at Sangju, Seongju, and Daegu as well, so that when the soldiers arrive there they can feed themselves of course. Soldiers going out to an urgent fight ought to press on at double pace, caring nothing for day or night; yet now they delay and drag out the days and lose the opening, which is much to be lamented. In this too the court ought to rebuke him severely in stern words and make him march on the day the word reaches him, going down first to Daegu to join his force with Kim Eung-seo and Gwon Eung-su and drive out the enemy there; and when the enemy's strength has fallen back a little, let Kim Eung-seo and Gwon Eung-su remain at their assigned posts (信地) while Yi Si-eon moves his troops on into the Right Province and, together with Jeong Gi-ryong, takes the enemy of the Right Province. The situation leaves no choice but this.

The spring is already far advanced, and with the enemy's strength as it is, when the people have all scattered and the country is empty, with whom shall we build walls and plant garrison farms and make a far-seeing plan, even if we would? This enemy's evil designs are of ten thousand kinds: the camps they have joined and pitched and fastened run from Ulsan to Suncheon, more than nine hundred li, and Geoje and Namhae besides have become their lair, and the land there is rich, the first in the south. If now the enemy in their scattered parties are let come and go over several hundred li and plunder by divisions, driving out every one of the people left in our country so that none can plough or plant there; and if along the belt of the seacoast they call together the throngs of captives and gather like swarms of bees and ants and farm garrison lands as they please, and raise walls at the strong points, leaning on the rough ground, and link head to tail — then another day, though we should seek to take it with tens of thousands of soldiers, the position would be utterly hard. Therefore the business of today lies in deciding early and not in dragging on.

Your servant is in the midst of illness, and his spirit is clouded and spent, so that he cannot report the particulars in detail; but in the main it is thus. Prostrate, he begs that Your Majesty send this down to the Border Defense Council to be weighed and put into effect. Would this not be well?