Reporting the Enemy to the Ming, and Guarding Jeju and Namwon for Spring請具賊情奏聞。天朝且請防守濟州南原等邑及凡防春預備。啓
臣久在病中沉綿昏塞殘喘如縷些少精神亦已减半其於軍國之事固難容議但念國勢危如一髮而日月逾邁事機漸遠思之不覺寒心人皆以南北之事爲憂然北虜之憂憂在邊境南賊之憂憂在社稷不早圖之則後無及矣今歲律已盡而賊情狡詐百出尙無渡海之計已到春風脫有再動之變將何以處之伏見金睟狀啓則所載玄蘇之言極悖此不但要我以難從之請其於中國亦必如此以爲敗約起釁之端臣從前慮其如此而今不幸事勢浸浸近是其爲可憂庸有極乎竊料沈惟敬所言形色可疑者非一然以臣愚料則似是自知不能了事而欲歸過於他人以爲已地如所謂。天使早入倭營故倭不捲回此則歸咎於。天使也今使沈𢠘時來請我國之使必知我國不肯而執以爲辭以封事不成歸咎於我其實賊之去不去不關於我使之許否而自有兇謀也𢠘時若到則措辭應對所關甚重請令備邊司預爲磨琢酬應爲當。天使出來後凡百邊報一不馳報於。中朝蓋緣前頭事勢未可預度故未得指一言之而然也今則。天使已入賊營而賊情反覆如此我國似當直以此等情形依常時傳報邊情之例移咨於遼東使轉報按撫衙門亦一事也賊兵時在釜山一隅故我國水陸諸將徒以此處爲急而不念他路以臣所料則濟州甚可憂往日賊使要時羅明言欲犯濟州可知此賊垂涎於此也蓋濟州當我國西南海且與中原地方相近萬一此地爲賊所據則雖欲以天下之力取之不可而西海一帶以及黃海平安之境皆無保守之勢此賊最知形勢計未必不出於此聞濟州甚爲孤單兵食竭乏癘疫飢饉甚於他處云添兵固守之䇿必須十分講究急速施行民間可蠲進上等物亦限年一切觸减以紓民力使得專意於防備爲當溯嶺之間無可控扼之處只有南原一府而邑宰久曠至今未赴其於儲粟鍊兵守城之事全無措置此處若失則他無可恃臣竊憂焉此亦催促新府使星馳往赴必期死守可也慶尙道則因蕩敗創殘之甚鍊兵等事未及料理其次則獨有忠淸道爲京師藩蔽而道內軍兵已經訓鍊者數千餘人此亦有將而分付主之預爲察其形勢所在而用之則緩急猶可倚仗。朝廷當初發遣御史李時發專掌訓鍊然臨戰則時發不能用之而他將代用不無變置部伍更改約束之弊所謂所養非所用所用非所養兵家之深忌也此亦。下諭都體察使使總合道內已鍊砲手幾何射手幾何殺手幾何各統於一將而大將出其節制然後軍心有定而臨時無渙散紊亂之弊也且聞各邑之軍在道內之官皆各分占一邑之軍有巡察使之軍兵水使之軍防禦使之軍御史之軍守令之軍號令多門文移眩亂莫適所從此我國從前積弊軍政之紊其源每出於此而忠淸道等處尙仍舊習云此亦速爲變更然後可也權仁龍趙光翼韓絢金時若所募之軍未知幾何然各隨其所得多少而校閱精否備給弓矢衣甲以聽主將約束則亦可以當一隅之用也此皆今日防春預備之不可已者臣病裏之言必多疎漏然區區憂國微忱不能自已故撥昏書。啓辭無倫次請。下備邊司參酌施行何如
I your servant have long been ill; the sickness drags on, my spirit is clouded and clogged, and my remaining breath is like a thread, while even the little spirit I had is already halved. In the affairs of army and state I am truly ill fit to join the deliberations. Only, when I consider that the state's array is as precarious as a single hair while the months and years flow by and the chances of action grow ever more distant, the thought of it chills my heart unawares.
Men all worry over the business of the south and of the north. But the trouble from the northern barbarians lies at the border, while the trouble from the southern enemy lies at the ancestral shrines and the altars of the land; if it is not planned for early, afterward it cannot be caught up with. This year too is already spent, and the enemy's inward reckoning puts out its cunning a hundredfold and has yet no mind to cross the sea; if, after the spring wind comes early, there is the calamity of their stirring again, how shall it then be dealt with?
Looking with respect at Kim Su's (金睟) dispatch, the words of Genso (玄蘇) set down in it are grossly outrageous. This is not only to demand of us requests hard to comply with; toward China too they will surely do the like, making of it the thread by which to break the agreement and raise a quarrel. I your servant have feared from before that it would come to this, and now, unhappily, the course of things draws nearer and nearer to it; how should there be any end to the worry of it?
Weighing it quietly, there is more than one or two things to doubt in what Shen Weijing (沈惟敬) says and in his looks. Yet to my foolish thinking it seems that, knowing he cannot himself bring the matter to an end, he would turn the blame onto others to make a footing for himself. What is said, that "the Heavenly Envoy (天使) entered the Japanese camp too early, and so the Japanese do not gather up and go home," is just this: it is to turn the blame onto the Heavenly Envoy. And in now having Shen Maoshi (沈懋時) come and ask for an envoy from our country, he surely knows our country will not be willing, and would seize on that for a pretext and turn onto us the blame for the investiture not being accomplished. In truth, whether the enemy withdraw or not does not hang on our granting an envoy; they have a foul design of their own. If Shen Maoshi arrives, the framing of words in reply is a matter of very great moment, and the Border Defense Council should be made to prepare the response beforehand.
Since the Ming envoy came out, not one of all the border reports has been hastened to the Ming court. In general it is because the course of what lies ahead could not be reckoned beforehand and no one thing could be pointed to. Now the Ming envoy has already entered the enemy's camp and the enemy's true state is overturned in this way, so it is one thing to be done that our country should send a dispatch (咨文) to Liaodong on such circumstances, by the practice of ordinary times for reporting border affairs, to be passed on to the Pacification Office.
Since the enemy troops are now in one corner at Busan, our country's naval and land commanders think only this place urgent and give no thought to other routes. By my reckoning Jeju is much to be worried over. In days past the enemy's envoy Yosira (要時羅) said openly that they meant to invade Jeju, so it may be known that this enemy is slavering over it. In general Jeju lies in the southwestern sea of our country and is also near to the land of the Central Plain. If this ground is seized by the enemy it could not be taken back though the strength of the whole world were brought against it, and from the whole West Sea to the bounds of Hwanghae and Pyeongan there would be no array by which to hold out. This enemy knows the lie of things best of all, and it cannot be said that their design will not come from here. It is heard that Jeju is very much alone, its soldiers and provisions exhausted, and plague and famine there worse than elsewhere. A plan to add soldiers and hold it firmly must be worked out to the full and put into effect with urgency. It is right also that the tribute goods that might be eased from the people be reduced altogether for a fixed number of years, so that the people's strength may unfold and their minds be given wholly to the defense.
Between Honam and Yeongnam there is no place fit for blocking and holding, and there is only the one district of Namwon; yet its magistracy has long been vacant and no one has taken up the post to this day. In the laying up of grain, the drilling of soldiers, and the holding of the wall there is no arrangement at all. If this place is lost there is nothing else to rely on, and I your servant worry over it quietly. Here too it is right to press the new Prefect to hasten to his post like a shooting star and to be held to defending it to the death.
Gyeongsang Province is sorely broken and hurt, and the drilling of soldiers there has not yet been dealt with. Next to it, Chungcheong Province alone is the hedge of the capital, and of the province's soldiers those who have already been through training are several thousand and more. Here too, if a commander is set in charge and the places where their array lies are looked over beforehand and used, they may still be relied on in urgency. The court at first sent the Inspector Yi Si-bal (李時發) to take charge of the training wholly; but when it came to battle Yi Si-bal could not use them and another commander used them in his place, so that there is no lack of the harm of changing the ranks and altering the agreements. This is what is called the reared not being the used and the used not being the reared, and it is deeply shunned by the military. Here too let a letter be sent down to the Supreme Commissioner, so that the musketeers already drilled within the province, however many, and the archers, however many, and the swordsmen, however many, be all added together and each company given to one commander to lead, with the chief general issuing their discipline; only then will the soldiers' hearts be settled and there be no harm of scattering and confusion when they face the work.
It is also heard that the soldiers of each district are taken up district by district by the officials within the province, each for himself, so that there are soldiers of the Circuit Commissioner, soldiers of the Army and the Navy Commanders, soldiers of the Defense Commander, soldiers of the Inspector, and soldiers of the magistrate, separately; and that commands issue from many places and the documents are in confusion, so that none knows what to follow. This is a harm long piled up in our country from before, and the source of the confusion of military administration always comes from here; and it is said that Chungcheong Province and such parts still keep to the old habit. This too must be amended quickly before it is right.
How many soldiers Gwon In-ryong (權仁龍), Jo Gwang-ik (趙光翼), Han Hyeon (韓絢), and Kim Si-yak (金時若) have gathered cannot be known. But if, according as each has got many or few, they are inspected for whether they are picked men or not and are provided with bows and arrows and clothing and armor and made to take the chief commander's agreements, they too can bear the use of one corner. None of this can be left off in providing beforehand for this spring's defense.
As these are the words of a sick man, there will surely be much that is thin and wanting in them. Yet unable of myself to leave off the small and humble sincerity of worry for the state, I have roused my clouded spirit and sent up this writing, and the words have no order. Would it not be well to send it down to the Border Defense Council to be weighed and put into effect?
Interlinear notes 1
The base text has 沈𢠘時; taken as an error for the Ming envoy Shen Maoshi (沈懋時), it has been corrected here. — translator