Yetgeul › Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) › Book 12 — The Record of Jinsa

Requesting Repairs to the Mountain Fortresses, and Careful Choice of Magistrates to Win the People請修葺山城以爲戰守之計且愼擇守令以收人心狀

Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) 懲毖錄 · Ryu Seong-ryong · 1633 (printed; written after the Imjin War) · 1 passages · 1,721 Chinese characters · reading time 14.6 min

Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) Book 12 — The Record of Jinsa A record left by Ryu Seong-ryong, Chief State Councillor, of what he saw with his own eyes after the Imjin War ended. Its title comes from the line, "I rebuke what is past, and take heed against troubles to come." He set down without excuse how the war began and what the court failed to do. His recommendation of Yi Sun-sin, the wrangling with the Ming army, and the suffering the people endured are all recorded as they were.

近日連得慶尙左監司韓孝純及兵使權應洙水使李由義等馳報兇賊屯據於梁山機張蔚山東萊釜山金海昌原等地勢甚鴟張造設房屋廣築城堡收聚粮餉聲言將犯晉州其勢極爲可虞蓋蔚山之賊若犯慶州以及內地則左道不可保矣梁山之賊更上直路而昌原之賊西犯晋州以及湖南則彼此不能相救而三道危矣大扺今日之勢當且守且戰此正古人所謂先爲不可勝以待賊之可勝今賊兵雖在海邊而中道則密陽以上已爲我地當隨其所得設險堅守必擇地勢形便要害之處或設土壘木栅多備器械使賊不敢來犯然後蓄力乘便精擇勇軍統於猛將飽士秣馬乘其賊勢動靜左右勦擊令賊騷然不安賊進無所得退失所據其勢將不久而遁逃因其退遁之際半渡之時水陸合兵四面蹙之則可以全勝臣之區區愚意爲今日計似無出於此者臣前日妄獻一得請於郡邑之城急設炮樓又請修葺山城令民入保賊至淸野以待者此正欲先爲固守之計也我國自古長於守城而短於野戰頃日權憟幸州之戰亦先得地利故賊兵多於我軍數倍盡日苦戰而終不能陷城大敗而歸賊之棄城遁歸者未必非此一戰爲之助也臣以此知今日急務無大於設險堅守而。天將中有識如駱參將等所言皆然請令該司急速商議如以爲可行則下于諸道漸次設立而山城之可守處曉諭民間各出其力次次繕修公私糓食亦令聚在其中然要不可限以時日以傷民力在當事者善措之如何耳炮樓之制若成則誠爲萬世之利但必有火藥火炮然後可以郤敵如火藥不敷火炮不多則徒設無益此亦。朝廷急急區處或設局於京中多聚匠人晝夜打造千萬餘介分送諸處火藥亦令外方自爲燔造使用之如水火則制敵保邦此爲利器不待他求也我國人情不能先事而圖事過則輒悔數年前軍器寺所藏火藥有二萬七千斤而臣其時隨在備邊司之列欲以二萬斤留京七千斤送于兩南以備倭寇而論者以爲京中火藥不可濫費只以數十斤充數分送竟爲賊所盡有而海邊防備之處或無有一二斤之儲雖欲用之其可得乎今宜深懲往事弛火藥私造之禁廣傳習銃筩之規凡人之不能操弓者盡爲火炮之軍分運作隊操鍊有法紀律素行則賊何由來犯而國家之辱庶可小雪矣古人云器械不利以其卒予敵驅市人而戰則雖名將猶雖成功今賊退已數月事勢危迫日甚一日而中外人情未免狃於少安尙無措置之事幾於悠悠度日萬一賊兵更爲長驅國事無稅駕之地臣之無狀竊獨寒心且嶺南則凶饉癘疫人民死亡殆盡自聞慶以下直至密陽數百里間人烟斷絕已成空虛之地雖欲有爲其勢末由今宜急於兩湖多般設䇿厚爲賞格及其兩麥之猶在民間汲汲收合則多至於萬石少亦數千餘石以此爲糧旣可以繼軍食又可以招集遊手以爲炮樓築壘之役故臣別爲狀。啓亦望該司急速擧行成送告身帖文則臣當遣帶行從事馳往購募獘不至及民而事亦可濟矣愼擇守令亦爲今日急務蓋兵興以後苟且充差民生之困於割剝未有如此時之甚怨毒憤罵至有不可恐聞者凡國家興衰撥亂之機必以先得民心爲務民心旣得則天意亦自然悔禍此必至之理也臣願今日諸道守令視平日更加愼擇稱才量能其有功勞才器者則拔擢授任貪鄙庸劣者漸爲澄汰又令監司及奉使出入之人宣布德意撫摩凋瘵若痛癏之在己使四方民情仰承。國家仁恤之意如得更生則雖勞而不怨矣近日非徒守令不體如傷之意至於奉。命往來之人亦甚衆多督責厨傳鞭扑吏民所至之處人皆騷動此亦更加申勑而務爲除獘然後驛路郡邑庶有一分之利矣且臣又有所慮。祖宗朝設立巨邑皆因一道形勢大小錯綜使之捍外衛內其意至深遠也以京畿言之則楊州水原廣州利川江華皆是京城藩蔽股肱之地此等之邑當須留意別爲愼擇守宰如長安之三輔洛腸之馮翊則京城自固矣利川府使邊應星今聞爲會寧府使應星在利川能績頗著紏合民兵捍禦盜賊故賊兵終始不敢深入而利川境內耕耘不失其時北道重地固當擇人然在今日則南邊賊路所經其任尤重臣之愚意亦望姑留應星使得撫輯成緒而廣州牧使亦十分擇人任之使廣州利川驪州三邑相比合勢稍稍完集則其爲後日之益不少矣此則但爲京畿一道而言耳他道形勢莫不皆然如忠州居國上流控扼咽喉忠州失守則沿江數百里皆爲受敵之地其重比他邑百倍臣尙未知元愼居官之狀如何然當今日板蕩新造之初恐非此人所了臣時未到其處從當親見更。啓計料而所以幷爲預陳者欲令。朝廷凡此等緊重守令一一愼取於差除之日毋致遞代紛然之獘臣本以無狀從前負國孤。恩久在行間無一寸效不意數月危病纒身性命如縷乞免重任更代他人以紓國亂而待命踰月尙無指揮病若漸蘇竊欲扶曳南去目見事益艱難臣之精神才力萬無報塞之路而疾病昏𥉠之中時有一二妄見不得不仰陳於。兼聽之下不自知量罪涉僣越惶恐無地

Of late your servant has received in succession urgent word from Han Hyosun (韓孝純), left governor of Gyeongsang, from the army commander Gwon Eungsu (權應洙), and from the naval commander Yi Yuui (李由義) and the rest. The vicious enemy hold Yangsan, Gijang, Ulsan, Dongnae, Busan, Gimhae, Changwon and such places, and their power stretches far; they build houses, raise walls and redoubts widely, gather and store army grain, and cry out that they will presently fall upon Jinju, so that the state of things is a care in the extreme. In general, if the enemy at Ulsan fall upon Gyeongju and reach to the inner land, the left circuit cannot be held; and if the enemy at Yangsan come up again by the straight road and the enemy at Changwon fall westward upon Jinju and reach Honam, then this side and that cannot relieve each other and all three provinces are in peril.

In general the state of things today requires that we fight while holding. This is just what the ancients called "first making it so that the enemy cannot beat you, and then waiting for a time when you may beat the enemy." Now the enemy soldiers are indeed on the seacoast, but of the middle road, from Miryang upward it is already our own land. We ought, place by place as we get them, to set out defences at the steep points and hold them fast. We must surely pick out the places where the lie of the land is easy and commanding, and raise earthen ramparts or wooden stockades and provide many weapons, so that the enemy dare not come and fall upon us; and after that, storing up strength and seizing the opening, we should pick out swift troops with care and have fierce commanders lead them, and feed the soldiers full and feed the horses, and watching the enemy's movements crush and strike them to left and right, so that the enemy are harried and never at ease. Then the enemy will gain nothing by advancing and lose their holding by withdrawing, and in no long while their condition will be such that they flee; and at the time of that withdrawal and flight, taking the moment when they are half across, if we unite the troops of water and land and drive upon them from all four sides, we may win outright. In your servant's trifling and foolish view there seems to be nothing better than this for the plan of today.

That your servant the other day rashly laid before you one view of his, asking that gun towers (砲樓) be raised in haste at the district walls, and asking besides that the mountain fortresses be repaired and the people sent in to hold them, and that when the enemy come the fields be emptied and they be awaited — this was precisely in order to set up first a plan for holding fast. Our country has from of old been long in the holding of walls and short in battle in the open. Gwon Yul's (權慄) fight at Haengju the other day too was because he first got the advantage of the ground, so that though the enemy soldiers were several times more than our troops and they fought bitterly the whole day, in the end they could not take the fortress and went back heavily beaten. That the enemy abandoned the capital and fled cannot be said to have owed nothing to that one battle. By this your servant knows that of the urgent matters of today there is none greater than setting out defences at the steep points and holding fast. Among the Ming commanders, those of discernment, such as Vice Commander Luo (駱參將), all say the same. We ask that the office concerned be made to deliberate upon it in haste, and if it be held practicable, that it be sent down to the several provinces to be raised little by little; and that where a place is fit to be held as a mountain fortress the people be instructed to put out their strength, each in turn, and repair it, and the grain of public and private be gathered within it as well. Yet the people's strength must not be injured by setting a term of days; it rests only upon those in charge disposing of it well.

If the system of gun towers be brought about, it will truly be a benefit for ten thousand generations. Only, it is after there is powder and cannon that the enemy may be driven off. If the powder is not ample and the cannon are not many, there is no benefit in merely setting them out. Let the court dispose of this too in haste: let an office be set up in the capital and many artisans gathered to make ten million and more of them night and day and send them out in shares to the several places; and let the powder be burnt and made in the outer provinces themselves, so that it may be used like water and fire. For pressing down the enemy and holding the country these are the useful implements, and there is nothing else to seek.

The temper of our country is that it cannot plan before a matter and repents as soon as the matter is past. Some years ago there were twenty-seven thousand geun of powder stored in the Armory (軍器寺); and your servant, being then in the ranks of the Border Defense Council (備邊司), wished to keep twenty thousand geun in the capital and send seven thousand geun to Yeongnam and Honam against the Wa raiders. But those who deliberated said that the capital's powder could not be spent at will, and only a few tens of geun were sent out in shares to make up the number. In the end it was all taken by the enemy, and there are places along the seacoast where the defence is held that have not a geun or two in store; though one would use it, could it be had? Now we ought to take deep warning from what is past, and loosen the ban upon making powder privately, and spread abroad the method of handling cannon and have it practised; and every man who cannot hold a bow should be made a soldier of the fire-weapons, divided into bands and formed into companies. If there is a method in the drilling and discipline is kept in ordinary times, by what means will the enemy come and fall upon us? And the shame of the country may be nearly washed away in some part. The ancients said, "If the weapons are not sharp, it is to give your soldiers to the enemy; and if you drive the people of the market place to battle, then even a famed commander will find it hard to accomplish anything."

Now it is already some months since the enemy withdrew, and the peril and urgency of our condition grow worse by the day. Yet the temper of men within and without does not escape growing used to a little ease, and with nothing yet disposed of they pass the days almost to no purpose. If the enemy soldiers should drive far up again, the affairs of the state would have not even ground to unhitch the cart upon; and your servant, unworthy as he is, in secret and alone goes cold at heart.

Further, in Yeongnam the people are nearly all dead of the bad harvest and the pestilence, and from below Mungyeong as far as Miryang, through several hundred li, the smoke of cooking is cut off and it has become an empty land already. Though one would do something, the state of things gives nothing to proceed from. Now we ought in Honam and Hoseo to make haste, to set out devices of many kinds and make the rewards generous, and while the barley and wheat are still among the people to gather them up with all speed; and much would come to ten thousand seok, and little would still be several thousand seok. With this for provisions the soldiers' food may be kept up, and the idle may be called together besides and set to the work of raising gun towers and building ramparts. Therefore your servant submits a separate report, and asks that the office concerned carry it out in haste and make up the warrants of appointment and send them. Then your servant will send the staff officers who go about with him to hurry there and buy them up, so that no burden falls upon the people and the business may still be done.

The careful choosing of magistrates is also an urgent matter of today. In general, since the troops rose, appointments have been made shiftily, only to fill the posts; and the people's living has never been so sorely stripped and pared as at this time. Their resentment and bitter cursing have come to a pass that cannot be borne to hear. Now the ground upon which a state rises or falls and order is brought out of confusion lies always in striving first to win the hearts of the people. Win the hearts of the people, and heaven's will too repents of itself of sending down calamity; this is a principle that surely comes about. Your servant hopes that the magistrates of the several provinces will today be chosen with more care than in ordinary times, matched to their talents and weighed for their ability, so that those of merit and capacity are picked out and charged with office and the greedy and worthless are gradually sifted out and dismissed. And let the governors and those who come and go bearing commands spread abroad and make known the sovereign's benevolent intent, and soothe the withered and sickened people as though their pain were in their own bodies. If the hearts of the people in the four quarters look up to and receive the intent of the state's benevolent care, as though they had come to life again, then though they are put to toil they will not resent it.

Of late not only do the magistrates fail to take to themselves the intent of looking upon the people as one looks upon the wounded; those too who come and go bearing commands are very many, and they press for their entertainment and flog clerks and people, so that wherever they come all men are in an uproar. This too, only after it is ordered again and strict pains are taken to do away with the abuse, will the post roads and the districts have some benefit of it, were it but a fraction.

Your servant has a further care. That the ancestral reigns set up great districts was in every case to interlace the lie and the size of a province, so as to block the outside and hold the inside; and the intent of it is deep and far-reaching in the extreme. To speak of Gyeonggi: Yangju, Suwon, Gwangju, Icheon, and Ganghwa are all the fence of the capital and lands that are as its arms and legs. For such districts one ought to give thought and choose the magistrates with particular care; do as with the Three Protectorates (三輔) of Chang'an or Fengyi (馮翊) of Luoyang, and the capital grows firm of itself. Your servant hears that Byeon Eungseong (邊應星), magistrate of Icheon, has now been made magistrate of Hoeryeong. Byeon Eungseong, being at Icheon, had his achievements plainly shown, rallying the people and the soldiers and blocking the robbers, so that the enemy soldiers in the end dared not come deep in and within the bounds of Icheon the ploughing and weeding did not lose their season. The northern provinces are weighty ground and truly need a man chosen for them; but as of today the enemy's road of passage along the southern edge is the heavier charge. In your servant's foolish view Byeon Eungseong should for now be kept where he is, to soothe and gather and bring the thread of things to order; and the magistracy of Gwangju too should be entrusted to one chosen with all care, so that the three districts of Gwangju, Icheon, and Yeoju stand side by side and unite their strength and are gradually gathered whole again; then the benefit hereafter will be no small one.

This is said only of the one province of Gyeonggi, but there is no province whose condition is not the same. Such a place as Chungju lies upstream of the country and is where the throat is drawn in and blocked; if Chungju cannot be held, then several hundred li along the river all become ground that receives the enemy, and its weight is a hundredfold against that of other districts. Your servant does not yet know what sort of showing Won Sin (元愼) makes in office. But at this day, at the outset of setting up anew a state that has been shaken to its roots, he fears it may not be a thing that this man can bear. Your servant has not yet reached that place, and he will duly look upon it himself and then report again for your reckoning. The reason he lays it before you beforehand as well is that the court, on the day it confers office upon such urgent and weighty magistracies, may choose each one with care and not come to the confused abuse of changing them about.

Your servant is unworthy from the first, and has until now failed the country and failed its grace, and being long in the army has had not an inch of result to show. Beyond all expectation a perilous illness of some months has bound itself upon his body and his life hangs by a thread. He begged to lay down his heavy charge and that another be put in his place to loosen the confusion of the state; but he has waited upon the command more than a month and there is still no direction. When his illness is a little mended he would drag his body and go south. To the eye the business grows harder, while with your servant's spirit and talent there is no way to repay and ward off even one part in ten thousand. In the midst of illness and dimness he has from time to time one or two rash views, and he could not but look up and lay them before you, who hear on every side. Not knowing his own measure, his fault touches upon presumption, and in awe he has nowhere to put himself.

Interlinear notes 4

六月三十日

The last day of the sixth month

The base text has 雖, taken as an error for 難.

The base text has 恐, taken as an error for 忍.

The base text has 洛腸, taken as an error for 洛陽.