Leaving Eumjuk and Juksan to Defend Yeoju First, and Hastening the Right Defense Commander請舍陰竹竹山先爲措置驪州防守且右防禦使速爲差送狀

Your servant reverently received, on the road at Hwangju, the royal directive drawn up by the Right Assistant Royal Secretary on the tenth of this month. It said: "Now I hear that the Japanese enemy appear and vanish by turns about the borders of Jinju and Uiryeong, and that one band is coming up along the Nakdong River, so that there is no little fear they will head straight for the capital. Though one branch of Regional Commander Wu's army remains at Chungju, its posture is solitary and weak. Let the Gyeonggi Defense Commander pick out nimble troops and advance to station them in the borders of Eumjuk and Juksan, so as to support Chungju from afar."

The great posture of barring and holding the capital rests on nothing but making much of the long river, and the troops are few and weak and the defenses thin, just as the directive says. On the day your servant left the walls he went round along the river and hurried to Yongjin, where the Left Defense Commander Byeon Eungseong (邊應星) had just picked out and was leading some nine hundred sogo troops of the Rear Encampment and, together with the hundred and more monk-soldiers encamped at Yongjin, was disposing matters for barring the fords.

But considering again the posture of the upper river, the single road of Yeoju weighs even more than Yongjin. For in the upheaval of the imjin year the enemy troops came by way of Chungju straight to Yeoju and crossed along the river before it; if this place is not held, then though we have Yongjin it is hard to warrant that it can be held. Therefore it was agreed that the Rear Encampment troops and the troops encamped at Yongjin should stay on at Yongjin and bar and cut off that place, and that Byeon Eungseong should hurry to Pasaseong, gather again the first-rank troops picked out under the Left Encampment, and be stationed there to await events.

Your servant, following the directive received earlier, was going to turn again toward the borders of Suwon and Yangseong in the Right Province and dispose matters for barring and cutting off the road that comes straight up from Honam. Now, receiving this directive, I know that one band of the enemy is coming up along the Nakdong River, and the posture of their striking at Joryeong is the more pressing. I shall go back and forth over the upper river again and tighten the defenses once more.

Only, since the postures of the enemy and of ourselves differ in the many and the few and in strength and weakness, we ought to choose our ground and lean on the steep places and make that our plan for holding out. Once the enemy troops have crossed Joryeong, our troops ought properly to hold the river side. Juksan and Eumjuk are neither of them places to station troops and bar and cut off. If the troops posted in division on the river side were all gathered up and advanced into empty country, the carriage of army grain would not keep up and there would be nothing to lean on in advancing or withdrawing; it does not seem a plan well got. Further, the distance from Yeoju to Chungju is rather nearer than from Eumjuk and Juksan, so that even if we would support Chungju, to abandon Yeoju and move forward to Eumjuk and Juksan does not seem fitting. Let the court weigh the posture again and instruct what is convenient.

The Jungnyeong road runs through to Wonju and Jecheon, and the Joryeong road through to Chungju and the Gyeonggi parts. If the Gangwon troops were stationed to hold Wonju and the Gyeonggi troops stationed at Yeoju as the posture allows, to support Chungju, and if the steepness of river and mountain were not given up, then in a pressing hour a little strength could be got. As for the straight road at Juksan, it is wide open and has nothing that can be called a posture, with not one thing to lean on. Should the enemy troops divide and come out by the left and right roads, one road by Yeoju and Icheon and one by Yangseong and Anseong, then though there be some troops at Eumjuk and Juksan it would be hard to hope to bar and cut them off. This is the general shape of the posture of the one province.

In general the province has but one military officer, Byeon Eungseong, and he is wholly engaged in barring the upper river; the Right Province has as yet no Defense Commander, so that all the picking of troops, the disposing and the meeting of demands take no shape at all. When your servant was formerly in the Border Defense Council he saw that a man equal to being Defense Commander was hard to come by, and none was appointed. Yet the charge cannot be left empty on the ground that there is no man, and the springs of the work thereby spoiled. I hear that the former Prefect O Eollyang (吳彥良) now holds no charge. This man might perhaps be sent down. Your servant does not know what manner of man Eollyang is, but the state of affairs is distressing and urgent, and unable to do otherwise I raise his name and speak. Let the Border Defense Council also be made to weigh whether he is suitable or not and dispose of it with urgency.