Stratagems for the Even Battle敵戰計

無而示有，誑也。誑不可久而易覺，故無不可以終無。無中生有，則由誑而真，由虛而實矣，無不可以敗敵，生有則敗敵矣，如：令狐潮圍雍丘，張巡縛嵩為人千餘，披黑夜，夜縋城下，潮兵爭射之，得箭數十萬。其後復夜縋人，潮兵笑，不設備，乃以死士五百砍潮營，焚壘幕，追奔十餘里。

When there is nothing and you show that there is something, that is deception. Deception cannot last long and is easily found out, so the nothing must not stay nothing to the end. Make something out of nothing, and the deception turns to truth and the empty turns to the solid. With nothing you cannot break the enemy, but make something and you break him. So it was when Linghu Chao besieged Yongqiu. Zhang Xun bound straw into more than a thousand figures of men and clothed them in black, and by night let them down the wall. Linghu Chao's troops vied to shoot at them, and he gained several hundred thousand arrows. Later he again let men down by night, and Linghu Chao's troops laughed and did not make ready. Then with five hundred men sworn to die he cut into Linghu Chao's camp, burned the ramparts and the tents, and pursued them for more than ten li.

奇出於正，無正不能出奇。不明修棧道，則不能暗渡陳倉。昔鄧艾屯白水之北；姜維遙廖化屯白水之南，而結營焉。艾謂諸將曰：「維令卒還，吾軍少，法當來渡，而不作橋，此維使化持我，令不得還。必自東襲取洮城矣。」艾即夜潛軍，徑到洮城。維果來渡。而艾先至，據城，得以不破。此則是姜維不善用暗渡陳倉之計；而鄧艾察知其聲東擊西之謀也。

The extraordinary force (奇兵) comes out of the regular force (正兵). Without the regular you cannot bring out the extraordinary. If you do not openly repair the plank road, you cannot cross in secret at Chencang. Long ago Deng Ai camped north of the Bai river, and Jiang Wei sent Liao Hua to camp south of the Bai river and knit his lines there. Deng Ai said to his generals, "Jiang Wei has come back all at once, and our troops are few. By the rule he ought to cross over, yet he builds no bridge. This means Jiang Wei has sent Liao Hua to hold us here so that we cannot go back. He will surely strike Taocheng from the east." Deng Ai then moved his troops in secret by night and went straight to Taocheng. Jiang Wei did cross over, but Deng Ai had come first and held the city, so it could not be broken. Here Jiang Wei used the stratagem of crossing in secret at Chencang badly, and Deng Ai saw through his scheme of making a noise in the east and striking in the west.

乖氣浮張，逼則受擊，退則遠之，則亂自起。昔袁尚、袁熙奔遼東，眾尚有數千騎。初，遼東太守公孫康，恃遠不服。及曹操破烏丸，或說曹遂征之，尚兄弟可擒也。操曰：「吾方使斬送尚、熙首來，不煩兵矣。」九月，操引兵自柳城還，康即斬尚、熙，傳其首。諸將問其故，澡日：「彼素畏尚等，吾急之， 則並力； 緩之，則相圖，其勢然也。」或曰：此兵書火攻之道也，按兵書《火攻篇》前段言火攻之法，後段言慎動之理，與隔岸觀火之意，亦相吻合。

When the awry breath rises and spreads, press it and you take the blow; draw back and keep far from it, and the disorder rises of itself. Long ago Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi fled to Liaodong, and their following still numbered some thousands of horse. From the first Gongsun Kang, the grand administrator of Liaodong, had trusted in his distance and did not submit. When Cao Cao broke the Wuhuan, someone urged him to march on while he was about it, saying the Yuan brothers could be taken. Cao Cao said, "I am about to make him cut off the heads of Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi and send them here. There is no need to trouble the troops." In the ninth month Cao Cao drew his troops back from Liucheng, and Gongsun Kang at once beheaded Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi and forwarded their heads. His generals asked the reason, and Cao Cao said, "They have always feared Yuan Shang and the rest. If I press them, they join their strength. If I slacken, they prey on one another. Such is the force of it." Some say this is the way of attack by fire (火攻) in the book of war. The first part of the chapter on attack by fire speaks of the method of attacking with fire, and the latter part speaks of the reason for moving with care, and this agrees with the sense of watching a fire from the far bank.

兵書云：「辭卑而益備者，進也；……無約而請和者，謀也。」故凡敵人之巧言令色，皆殺機之外露也。宋曹瑋知渭州，號令明肅，西夏人憚之。一日瑋方對客奕棋，會有叛誇數千，亡奔夏境。堠騎（騎馬的探子）報至，諸將相顧失色，公言笑如平時。徐謂騎日：「吾命也，汝勿顯言。」西夏人聞之，以為襲己，盡殺之。此臨機應變之用也。若勾踐之事夫差，則意使其久而安之矣。

The book of war says, "When his words are humble and yet he adds to his defenses, he means to advance. ... When he asks for peace with no terms offered, he has a scheme." So all an enemy's clever words and fair looks are the killing intent (殺機) leaking out. When Cao Wei of the Song governed Weizhou, his orders were clear and stern, and the people of Xi Xia feared him. One day Cao Wei was at a game of go with a guest when some thousands of mutinous soldiers fled across into Xi Xia territory. The scout horseman's report came in, and the generals looked at one another and lost their color, but the duke laughed and talked as he always did, and slowly said to the horseman, "It is by my order. Do not speak of it openly." The people of Xi Xia heard this and took it that the men had come to strike at them, and they killed them all. This is the use of meeting the moment and answering the change. As for Goujian serving Fuchai, that was meant to set him at ease over a long time.

我敵之情，各有長短。戰爭之事，難得全勝，而勝負之訣，即在長短之相較，乃有以短勝長之秘訣。如以下駟敵上駟，以上駟敵中駟，以中駟敵下駟之類：則誠兵家獨具之詭謀，非常理之可測也。

In the circumstances of oneself and of the enemy each has its long points and its short. In war a complete victory is hard to come by, and the secret of winning or losing lies in weighing the long against the short, and here lies the secret of beating the long with the short. To set the lowest horse against the highest horse, the highest horse against the middling horse, and the middling horse against the lowest — this is truly a deceit that belongs to the school of war alone, and it cannot be measured by ordinary reason.

大軍動處，其隙甚多，乘間取利，不必以勝。勝固可用，敗亦可用。

Where a great army moves there are very many gaps. Ride the openings and take the gain, and you need not win by it. It can be used when you are winning, and it can be used when you are losing.