Holding Joryeong and Jungnyeong Passes, on the Chungcheong Governor's Report因忠淸監司書狀論鳥竹兩嶺防守事宜
忠淸監司書狀據司。啓目帖連。啓下云云鳥嶺竹嶺阻隔於忠淸慶尙之間把截之策固當十分嚴密但觀兩嶺形勢非但一條大路傍出細逕甚多若不備而但防一路則於事似爲無益且把截嶺路之術不在於設栅屯兵只於樹木險阻之處多設伏兵要遮前後使賊不測多少而首尾斷絕將有自退之理要在爲將者臨時處變或爲疑兵使山谷應聲或爲弓弩乘時發射尤當預發詳知道路哨探動靜之人賊鋒所向我輒先知隨其所至而備之則雖寡可以敵衆不然而賊先據險引入腹內則遮截極難往日忠州之敗可以爲鑑矣鳥嶺則延豐忠州槐山陰城等處之軍可專委防禦而此等州郡蕩敗已甚無以爲計竹嶺則雖有丹陽淸風永春堤川四邑在嶺下而亦皆凋殘把截之事恐難專責於此邑也且於賊兵未來之前發民數十餘守直山頭如常時盜直之例非徒飢餓之卒無望於禦賊而因其闕到輒爲徵督其弊不貲預爲分付定將多抄山尺能射之人申明約束臨有賊變卽時隨其所向合力把截似爲便當寧越當平昌原州等官亦一體施行事忠淸監司及江原監司處行移何如
On the Chungcheong governor's report, the Border Defense Council drew up a document to submit, attaching that report, and it was handed down as it stood.
Joryeong and Jungnyeong block the way between Chungcheong and Gyeongsang, so the plan for barring and cutting the enemy off must indeed be made strict to the full. Only, looking at the lie of the two passes, there is not merely the one great road but a great many narrow paths running off to the side. If we do not provide for these and bar the one road only, it seems there will be no profit in the business.
Further, the way to bar a pass does not lie in setting up palisades and encamping troops. If we only place many troops in ambush where the trees grow thick and the ground is steep, cutting off the front and the rear so that the enemy cannot reckon whether we are many or few, and so that his head and tail are severed, then there is a natural principle by which he will withdraw. The crux lies in the commander's handling of changes as the moment brings them: he may set out feigned troops so that the mountain valleys answer with their noise, or have bows and crossbows shoot as the moment allows. Still more, if we send out beforehand men who know the roads closely, to watch the enemy's movements, so that we learn first where his blade is turned and make ready according to where he comes, then even few troops can stand against many. Were it otherwise, and the enemy took the steep ground first and were drawn deep into the interior of the country, barring and cutting him off would be hard in the extreme; the defeat at Chungju in days past may serve as a mirror for this.
As for Joryeong, the defense might well be entrusted wholly to the troops of Yeonpung, Chungju, Goesan, Eumseong and those parts. But the ruin of these counties is already so deep that no plan can be laid. As for Jungnyeong, the four counties of Danyang, Cheongpung, Yeongchun and Jecheon lie below the pass, yet they too are all worn away, so we fear it will be hard to entrust the barring and cutting off to these counties alone.
Further, if before the enemy's troops come we send out some tens of the people to hold the mountain tops, as was the practice for guarding against robbers in peacetime, then not only can starving soldiers not be looked to for barring the enemy, but because he has not come they are at once pressed and levied upon, and the harm in that is not small. It seems convenient and fitting to give orders beforehand, appointing commanders and picking out many good archers from among the men who live by hunting in the mountains, making the terms plain to them over again, and then, when there is an alarm from the enemy, having them join their strength at once to bar and cut him off according to where he turns.
May the matter of carrying this out in one and the same way in Yeongwol, Pyeongchang, Wonju and other counties be sent by dispatch to the governors of Chungcheong and of Gangwon?
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