Yetgeul › Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) › Book 8 — The Record of Jinsa

Report Discussing Enemy Strength論報賊勢狀

Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) 懲毖錄 · Ryu Seong-ryong · 1633 (printed; written after the Imjin War) · 1 passages · 631 Chinese characters · reading time 5.4 min

Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) Book 8 — The Record of Jinsa A record left by Ryu Seong-ryong, Chief State Councillor, of what he saw with his own eyes after the Imjin War ended. Its title comes from the line, "I rebuke what is past, and take heed against troubles to come." He set down without excuse how the war began and what the court failed to do. His recommendation of Yi Sun-sin, the wrangling with the Ming army, and the suffering the people endured are all recorded as they were.

臣前者聞賊將有添兵之報卽發遣臣軍官金善義於黃海道傳通巡察使及防禦使等處使之與左防禦使合兵邀截且急通於江華乘賊下來以舟師橫截津渡以止其西下之勢且又通於防禦使李鎰使之紏合諸陣之兵乘機勦擊且聞大同江等處賊兵無備往來自如又令金億秋率舟師乘夜直上焚毀賊船且以神機箭火炮等多數發射衝火於大同門而預令一人潜布菱鐵於門外乘其亂出之際從船上亂射各處諸將憚於賊衆皆按甲不前使賊千里橫行一無呵禁坐令平壤兇徒多聚前頭之事極爲可憂平壤地形西北險固而東南平易舟師一事固當早施掩其不意可以有功而當初遲疑不進久失機會十八日始爲進去而無及於已聚之賊更違節制徒令賊兵覺知而少無所獲只以數隻空船備數塞責亦何益於事哉大扺軍律解弛遠近將士皆無力戰之心賊氣日盛而我勢日弱許多戰陣所用器械皆不整辦徒持弓矢以爲禦賊之具夫弓矢固爲利器而百步之外不能當鐵丸數步之內無以制短兵軍士旣無所恃則其致奔敗亦不足怪今因慶尙道狀啓陪持人聞兵使朴晉擊破諸處賊陣時用連弩震天雷此最爲敵人所畏云今雖已晚猶可措備而各官所有震天雷皆失其制度不可以飛擊欲更鑄成則必費時日江邊列邑有所急令該司輸到軍前以備戰用爲當。天兵出來日期全未聞知雖稱軍事尙密而期日已盡賊謀難測朝夕之間憂慮萬端而環顧在我之勢無一可恃痛悶罔極。朝廷各別多般聞見計議亭當急急通諭俾無狼狽之虞江冰若合則北虜之事亦甚可慮臣意北虜貪而無計易以利誘如有更以來救之狀言說則姑爲鎭撫賞給以息其狼噬之患如唐時欲圖恢復不得不與回籺連和蓋其勢然也臣言似迃而實關大計不勝區區悶迫之忱累次陳達極爲惶恐

Your servant, having earlier heard the report that the enemy were about to add to their troops, at once sent his military officer Kim Seonui (金善義) to Hwanghae Province to pass word to the Inspector and to the Defence Commander and such places, and had them join forces with the Left Defence Commander to meet and cut the enemy off. He also sent urgent word to Ganghwa (江華) that, taking the chance of the enemy's coming down, they should block the ferry crossings with the naval forces and so halt their movement down to the west; and he sent word to Defence Commander Yi Il (李鎰) as well, to rally the troops of the several camps and, taking the chance, strike and kill them. He heard further that at the Daedong River (大同江) and such places the enemy soldiers were going back and forth as they pleased without precaution, and so had Kim Eokchu (金億秋) take the naval forces and, under cover of night, go straight up and burn and break the enemy's ships; and had him fire many singijeon (神機箭) rockets and cannon to set fire to the Daedong Gate, and beforehand had one man secretly lay caltrops outside the gate, so that when they came rushing out in confusion his men might shoot volleys at them from aboard the ships.

But the several commanders everywhere, shrinking from the numbers of the enemy, all halted their troops and did not advance, so that the enemy were let range a thousand li as they pleased and were not once rebuked and barred. Sitting still, they have let the vicious horde at Pyeongyang gather in great numbers, and what lies ahead is cause for the utmost anxiety.

The lie of the land at Pyeongyang is steep and firm to the north-west, flat and easy to the south-east. As for the one business of the naval forces, had it truly been set in motion early and fallen upon them unawares, there would have been merit in it; but at the outset they hesitated and doubted and did not advance, and so long lost the opportunity. Only on the eighteenth day did they at last go forward, and then they could not reach the enemy who had already gathered. Breaking the order of command again, they did no more than let the enemy soldiers become aware of them, and with nothing at all gained they merely made up the count with a few empty ships and so stopped the mouth of their responsibility. What help is that to the business either?

In general, military discipline has come loose and slack, and the commanders and soldiers, far and near, have none of them a mind to fight with all their strength. The enemy's spirit grows stronger by the day and our own condition weaker by the day. Of the many weapons needed for battle not one set is fully provided, and with bows and arrows alone they make shift for an implement to hold off the enemy. Now bows and arrows are truly a sharp implement, yet beyond a hundred paces they are no match for lead shot, and within a few paces they cannot master short weapons. The soldiers having nothing already to rely upon, it is no wonder that it comes to their fleeing and breaking.

Now your servant hears from the man who came bearing the Gyeongsang Province report that when the Provincial Military Commander Pak Jin (朴晉) broke the enemy camps in various places he used repeating crossbows (連弩) and jincheonroe (震天雷) bombs, and that these the enemy feared most of all. Though it is late now, they may still be provided. But the jincheonroe held in the several districts have all lost their proper make and cannot be hurled and fired, and to cast them anew would surely take days. It would be fitting that those held in the several districts along the river be hastily shipped by the office in charge to the camp, to be used in the fighting.

Of the date on which the Ming troops will come out, nothing at all has been heard. Military affairs are said to prize secrecy, yet the appointed term is already spent and the enemy's designs are hard to reckon; between morning and evening the cares run in ten thousand strands, and looking round upon the condition we are in there is not one thing to rely upon, so that the pain and oppression are without end. Let the court particularly hear and see in many ways, weigh and deliberate upon what is fitting, and send word urgently abroad, that there be no care of utter ruin.

Should the river freeze over, the business of the northern barbarians too is much to be feared. In your servant's view the northern barbarians are covetous but without design, and so are easily enticed with advantage. If there should again be talk of their coming to our relief, let them for now be pacified and given rewards, so as to stay the care of their biting like wolves. It is as in the time of the Tang, when in seeking to recover what was lost there was no choice but to make peace with the Uyghurs (回紇); for in general their condition was such. Your servant's words may seem roundabout, yet in truth they bear upon the great plan, and being unable to master his petty oppressed and urgent sincerity he lays them before you repeatedly, in utmost dread.

Interlinear notes 1

壬辰十一月

The eleventh month of the Imjin year