Yetgeul › Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) › Book 10 — The Record of Jinsa

Enemy Strength at the Capital, Each General Given a Command to Strike, and Asking Superintendent Song for Southern Troops to Cut the Enemy's Retreat論京城賊勢且節制諸將各有統屬處處截邀仍乞請宋經略送南方精卒于忠淸等道使先勦滅漢江以南屯守之賊以斷賊歸路狀

Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) 懲毖錄 · Ryu Seong-ryong · 1633 (printed; written after the Imjin War) · 1 passages · 1,510 Chinese characters · reading time 11.8 min

Jingbirok (A Record of Rebuke and Admonition) Book 10 — The Record of Jinsa A record left by Ryu Seong-ryong, Chief State Councillor, of what he saw with his own eyes after the Imjin War ended. Its title comes from the line, "I rebuke what is past, and take heed against troubles to come." He set down without excuse how the war began and what the court failed to do. His recommendation of Yi Sun-sin, the wrangling with the Ming army, and the suffering the people endured are all recorded as they were.

城中賊勢則諸處體探之人逐日來告而所言不一惟高彥伯之軍皆是京城楊州等處之人故其所哨探之辭頗得其實又據逃回人供招大槪京中賊勢近日多數聚會當初。天兵始到之日賊兵甚少自肅淸門藏義門東小門皆無守城之賊北邊蕩然空虛只有南邊一帶以及山頭有賊而甚爲稀疎又於幸州之敗死者太半今則北賊盡入京城原州之賊亦爲來聚城中如興德洞柏子亭洞等處賊兵皆屯守自南大門以及慕華館近處賊陣連絡龍山倉則平壤敗歸之後設城屯遽漢江亦有賊陣橫結浮橋以相通行而沙平院穿峴一路賊兵亦多出沒焚蕩臣以此米甞不痛恨於。天將之一失機會使至於難圖也臣每念用兵制勝惟當先得形勢而已形勢旣得則雖弱可以制强今賊旣屯據京邑憑恃險阻而龍山等倉尙有餘糓主客勞逸之形懸然不同如非。天兵大勢進勦則我兵難以輕進也但賊兵千里連屯自漢江以南直至慶尚道孤軍深入而左右皆有我軍若能約束諸處官義之兵先擊道路往來之賊使首尾斷絕則京城之賊雖以鐵爲城不得不動矣伺其遁歸之際從後追擊可以全勝而我國將士一無致力之人至於義兵自京畿以及忠淸道無慮五十餘將而不受節制於官軍判渙乖離日就散亡勢難有爲而官軍則其數亦少率皆拱手旁觀一不下手人有問之則必曰姑待唐兵極爲痛心臣方頗爲節制各以近處之軍分屬武將使有統屬如楊州加平坡州長淵豐德高陽交河抱川積城朔寧漣川永平之軍則屬於高彥伯使之勦截京城東北及碧蹄延曙等處之賊利川驪州楊根砥平陰竹陽智等邑之軍及召募使俞大進義兵將李軼等軍屬於助防將邊應星使之勦捕竹山陽智金亮等處之賊廣州龍仁果川及義兵將金琢等軍屬於廣州牧使李箕賓勦捕沙平院穿峴龍仁等處之賊全羅兵使宣居恰在秃城故使之節制通津金浦陽川衿川安山水原南陽振威陽城安城之軍分付別將使與李箕賓邊應星等相對挾擊沙平院以下一路之賊而忠淸巡察使許頊兵使李沃駐軍於稷山安城之間遮蔽東路以護糧道且以勦截竹山以下之賊而各處義兵尤多亦當有所統屬如竹山義兵則屬於洪季男鎭川義兵陰城義兵忠州社倉義兵槐山報恩等處義兵亦皆擇其中可任者分統責以勦擊其處之賊而如有惰慢自便逗遛不進撓敗軍機者一切以軍法從事則旬日之間人心齊奮士氣頗振賊平庶幾有望矣聞忠淸道義兵則受制於建義大將沈守慶故本道巡察使以下不敢行其號令而守慶遠在牙山軍機之事頃刻變遷策應之急瞬息雖違往來禀命於遠處豈能保其不失機會。朝廷急速以此意馳諭于建義大將使行其節制龍山倉火攻一䇿臣亦料理已久茨忠淸水使丁傑近日率舟師往來於龍山之下者有日又令京畿水使李蘋及倡義使金千鎰各率舟師以助聲勢又借火箭數十于。天將送于丁傑使之相機善處但龍山地勢江面有斷壠倉在其內我軍若容易下陸爲賊所掩則必至奔敗故臣令丁傑等逐只精鍊敢進素諳地形之人然後乃可故至今未試從當百分詳審處置計料矣臣甞觀兵書云攻堅則瑕者堅攻瑕則堅者瑕故用兵之道先自敵人瑕而攻之則堅者自解今賊之精兵盡聚城中法不可速攻而漢江以南往來之寇則皆是羸兵疲卒輸運卜駄之賊擊之易勝且水路自開城府到江華自江華渡通津道路無阻而南方粮糓亦多饋餉甚易若以南方炮手數千統於猛將從水路繞出賊後與我軍作爲形勢乘其不意直進勦擊峰屯蟻雜之寇豈能支吾漢江以南之賊可一擧蕩盡則忠州以北賊路斷絕京城之賊將不攻自潰如此然後大軍從後皷行以進與前軍合勢姑留其歸路而追擊之賊當隻騎不返此甚今日之第一奇䇿前日頗言於在此。天將而率皆武人麤疎莫肯念聽宋經略已到其處急以此意傳告幸而見聽則非徒我國之幸亦天下之幸也鄭希玄朴名賢等軍亦聞來到楊州令與高彥伯李時言等連營以截東路而軍糧不繼京畿各邑及江原道伊川平康安峽等邑些少之糓盡數括取以爲。天兵之糧更無可措之勢惟此一事計無所出民間無斗粟之儲而前日募粟事目太重今經半年尙無應募之人中流失船一壺千金今豈可計其多少亦乞。朝廷急速講究得粟之䇿如無食則雖有精兵萬數許多計䇿而皆無可用矣此臣之日夜焦心不知所出者也

As to the shape of the enemy within the walls, the scouts from several places come and tell us day by day, but their words are not alike. Only the troops of Go Eonbaek (高彥伯) are all men of the capital and of Yangju and those parts, so that what they have scouted and brought back comes fairly near the truth; and there are besides the statements of those who have fled back, and in the main it is thus.

The enemy at the capital have gathered in numbers of late. On the day when the Ming troops first arrived the enemy troops were very few, and at Sukcheongmun, Janguimun, and Dongsomun there were no enemy holding the walls at all and the northern edge lay quite empty, and only along the one belt to the south and on the hilltops were there enemy, and these very thin. Moreover more than half were killed in the defeat at Haengju. But now the northern enemy have all gone into the capital and the enemy of Wonju have come and gathered too.

Within the walls, in such places as Heungdeokdong and Baekjajeongdong, the enemy troops are all encamped and holding, and from Namdaemun to near Mohwagwan the enemy's lines run on without a break. At the Yongsan granary they built walls and encamped and held it after coming back beaten from Pyongyang, and there are enemy lines at the Han River too, where they have strung a boat bridge across and come and go to one another. Along the one road of Sapyeongwon (沙平院) and Cheonhyeon (穿峴) also enemy troops appear in numbers and burn and plunder. Your servant for this reason has never ceased to grieve bitterly that the Ming general, having once lost his opening, has brought it to this pass where it is hard to contrive anything.

Your servant has always thought that to use arms and win lies only in first getting the shape of things. Get the shape of things, and even the weak may press down the strong. Now the enemy are already encamped and holding at the capital and trust in their steep places, and in the granaries of Yongsan and the rest there is grain still left, so that the shape of things for the holder and for the striker, for the one at ease and the one that labors, is altogether different. Unless the Ming troops advance in great force and crush them, our troops alone can hardly go forward lightly.

Only, the enemy troops are encamped one after another over a thousand li, reaching from south of the Han River straight to Gyeongsang Province, so that they are a lone force gone deep in, and on their left and right are our troops everywhere. If the government troops and the righteous troops in every place were mustered and the enemy going to and fro upon the road were struck first and their head and tail cut off, then the enemy at the capital, though they made their walls of iron, could not but stir. And if we watched for the time of their fleeing back and pursued and struck them from behind, the victory could be entire.

Yet among the commanders and troops of our country there is not one man who spends his strength. As for the righteous troops, from Gyeonggi to Chungcheong Province there are, at a rough reckoning, fifty-odd commanders; but as they are not under the command of the government troops they are split and set at odds and scatter and vanish by the day, so that in this shape of things it is hard to accomplish anything. The government troops, few in number as they are, for the most part fold their arms and look on from the side and do not set a hand to it once; and if anyone asks them, they are sure to say, "We are waiting upon the Ming troops for now." This is most painful to the heart.

Your servant has now set up some command and has divided the troops of each nearby place and attached them to military officers, so that they have someone to lead them. The troops of Yangju, Gapyeong, Paju, Jangdan, Pungdeok, Goyang, Gyoha, Pocheon, Jeokseong, Sangnyeong, Yeoncheon, and Yeongpyeong he has attached to Go Eonbaek, to crush and cut off the enemy northeast of the capital and at Byeokje, Yeonseo, and those parts. The troops of Icheon, Yeoju, Yanggeun, Jipyeong, Eumjuk, Yangji, and the other districts, and the troops of Yu Daejin (俞大進), the recruiting commissioner (召募使), and of Yi Il (李軼), a commander of the righteous troops, and the rest, he has attached to the auxiliary commander Byeon Eungseong (邊應星), to crush and take the enemy at Juksan, Yangji, Geumnyang, and those parts. The troops of Gwangju, Yongin, and Gwacheon, and the troops of Kim Tak (金琢), a commander of the righteous troops, and the rest, he has attached to Yi Gibin (李箕賓), magistrate of Gwangju, to crush and take the enemy at Sapyeongwon, Cheonhyeon, Yongin, and those parts. As Seon Geoi (宣居怡), the Jeolla army commander, is at Dokseong, he has had him command the troops of Tongjin, Gimpo, Yangcheon, Geumcheon, Ansan, Suwon, Namyang, Jinwi, Yangseong, and Anseong, and has given orders to the separate commanders that, facing Yi Gibin and Byeon Eungseong and the rest, they take between them and strike the enemy of the one road below Sapyeongwon. Heo Uk (許頊), the Chungcheong Patrol Commissioner, and Yi Ok (李沃), the army commander, are to halt their troops between Jiksan and Anseong and bar the eastern road and guard the grain road, and to crush and cut off the enemy below Juksan besides.

The righteous troops in every place are more numerous still, and these too must have someone to lead them. The righteous troops of Juksan he has attached to Hong Gyenam (洪季男); and of the righteous troops of Jincheon, the righteous troops of Eumseong, the righteous troops of Sachang in Chungju, and the righteous troops of Goesan, Boeun, and those parts, he has had men chosen from among them who may be entrusted with the charge and set to lead them by divisions, and has laid upon them the duty of striking the enemy in those places. If there be any who are slothful and take their own ease and hang back and do not advance and throw the openings of war into confusion and ruin them, they shall one and all be dealt with by military law. Then within ten days the hearts of men will rise up together in order and the spirit of the troops will be greatly stirred, and there will be hope of pacifying the enemy.

Your servant hears that the righteous troops of Chungcheong Province are bound to Sim Sugyeong (沈守慶), the commander-in-chief of the volunteer rising (建義大將), and that therefore the Patrol Commissioner of that province and those below him dare not carry out any command. But Sim Sugyeong is far off at Asan, while the openings of war shift in a moment and the urgency of answering them goes wrong in the blink of an eye; and if word must go to and fro to a far place to ask for orders, what warrant is there that the opening will not be lost? Let the court with haste make this intent known to the commander-in-chief of the volunteer rising, that his command may be rightly carried out.

The one design of striking the Yongsan granary with fire your servant too has long weighed. Accordingly Jeong Geol (丁傑), naval commander of Chungcheong, has of late led the naval forces to and fro below Yongsan for several days, and your servant has had Yi Bin (李蘋), the Gyeonggi naval commander, and Kim Cheonil (金千鎰), commissioner for raising righteous troops, lead their naval forces each and help with sound and show of force. He has besides borrowed several score fire-arrows from the Ming generals and sent them to Jeong Geol, that he might watch for an opening and handle it well. Only, the lie of the land at Yongsan has a cut-off bluff on the river side with the granary within it, so that if our troops land easily and are then fallen upon by the enemy they must surely crumble and flee. Therefore your servant told Jeong Geol and the rest to pick out and drill picked men one by one, and to choose men who dare to go forward and who know the lie of the land well, and only then to act; and so it has not yet been attempted, and he means to look into it a hundred times over before disposing of it.

Your servant once read in a book of war, "If you strike where he is firm, what was flawed becomes firm; if you strike where he is flawed, what was firm becomes a flaw." Therefore the way of using arms is to strike the enemy's flaw first, and then what was firm loosens of itself. Now the enemy's swift troops are all gathered within the walls and by the rule of war cannot be struck quickly; but the enemy who go to and fro south of the Han River are all weak and weary troops and bearers of baggage, and are easily beaten if struck. Moreover the water road goes from Gaeseong to Ganghwa and crosses from Ganghwa to Tongjin with no bar upon the way, and the grain of the south is plentiful besides, so that the feeding of them is very easy.

If several thousand gunners of the south were put under a swift commander and sent round by the water road to come out behind the enemy and make a shape of things together with our troops, and if, taking a time they did not look for, they went straight forward and struck, how should the enemy, encamped like swarming bees and mingled like ants, hold out? Sweep away the enemy south of the Han River at one stroke, and the enemy's road above Chungju is cut and the enemy at the capital will crumble of themselves without being struck. Then let the great army beat the drum and advance from behind and join its force with the troops in front, and let their road of return be left them a while and then pursue and strike them, and not one horseman of the enemy will get home; this is truly the first and most extraordinary design of today. The other day your servant said as much to the Ming generals who are here, but as they are for the most part military men and rough and loose they would not take it to heart and heed it. Superintendent Song (宋經略) has already reached that place, so let this intent be passed on to him with haste; and if he be so good as to heed it, it will be the good fortune not of our country only but of all under heaven.

It is said that the troops of Jeong Hihyeon (鄭希玄), Bak Myeonghyeon (朴名賢), and the rest have reached Yangju too, so your servant has had them pitch camp after camp with Go Eonbaek, Yi Sieon (李時言), and the rest and cut the eastern road. Yet the army grain is not kept up, and the little grain of the several districts of Gyeonggi and of Icheon, Pyeonggang, Anhyeop, and the other districts of Gangwon Province has all been scraped up and made the rations of the Ming troops, and there is no means of providing more. In this one matter alone no design comes forth. Among the households there is not a peck of grain in store, and the terms for gathering grain set out the other day were too heavy, so that to this day, half a year after, there is no one who has answered to them. It is said that when a man loses his boat in mid-water one jar of water is worth a thousand gold; how then should we now reckon much or little? Your servant begs besides that the court seek out with haste a design for getting grain. If there be nothing to eat, then though there were ten thousand swift troops and designs in plenty, all would be of no use. This is what your servant burns his heart over night and day, and yet finds no way.

Interlinear notes 2

癸巳三月五日

The fifth day of the third month of the Gyesa year

The source text has 長淵, but this is taken to be an error for 長湍 (Jangdan)