Forwarding a Letter from the Japanese倭書上送狀

Of the letters of the Japanese enemy, the one presented to the Ministry of Rites was kept in that place by General Zha (査將), who only had it copied and shown; so it is written out afresh and sent up. And one letter of the Japanese enemy got by Jeong Geol (丁傑), naval commander of Chungcheong, is sent up together with it. These are matters whose bearing is of the greatest moment, so let the court deliberate upon them closely with haste and give direction.

In the main, the reason why the Japanese do this is that their inward designs are three. After their defeat at Pyongyang they were defeated at Haengju besides, and their swift troops are nearly spent; and though now the enemy of the northern provinces and of Wonju and those parts have come and gathered in the one walled town, the Ming troops are behind them and the troops of our country are many upon their road of return southward, and the naval commander Jeong Geol, and Yi Bin (李蘋), the Gyeonggi naval commander, and Kim Cheonil (金千鎰) and the rest bar the river mouth each with his naval forces, and the troops of Go Eonbaek (高彥伯) fight and shed blood east of the walls day by day, so that our troops have lost nothing and the enemy troops have been killed in numbers. This is what is called a lone force gone deep in, whose return is hard to bring well to an end; so that the crafty barbarians have in truth already had their livers burst — this is the first. Having fought far afield over into another year, their troops are weary and their purpose broken and the soldiers think of going home, but their fierce chief will not allow it; so they would make this their pretext to go back and report to the kanpaku (關白) and return to their own country — this is the second. By talking of peace they would slacken the Ming troops for the present and wait for their own troops coming behind, and add to their forces and work their poison at will — this is the third.

Looking quietly at the Ming generals' disposing and words, your servant finds that from before now their intent to use arms has not been carried out and designs for making peace and withdrawing the troops have come out mixed with it; and now by this business that design is the more put into practice. Therefore yesterday your servant went with Kim Myeongwon (金命元) to where General Zha was, to see where his intent lay; but General Zha excused himself, saying that he lay sick of an illness got from the cold, and would not see us.

At night General Zha sent one of his household guard (家丁) secretly, who came to your servant's lodging and passed on his words: "When my illness is mended I shall go myself to the quarters of the Japanese and deceive them and first draw out the princes." His intent was to have your servant draw up a letter in reply to the Japanese.

Your servant answered, "That the Japanese enemy, when they grow weak, make a false peace and slacken our arms is a common thing. In the fighting at Imjin and at Pyongyang before this it was all thus; how then should we trust and heed them and fall into their crafty design? Still more, as Your Honor before this at Pyongyang had already entered the walls and seen the Japanese and yet used arms at once, the Japanese must already have harbored their resentment, so that it is plain you cannot now see the fierce enemy in person. As for the drawing up of a letter, our country has with this enemy a grudge that reaches to the ends of heaven and the ends of earth; though we die, how should there be any reason to make peace?" — and he declined and sent the man away.

Yet this morning General Zha called the interpreter again and said, "Today my illness is less; I shall communicate with the Supreme Commander and the State Councillor and deliberate upon the business together." What he will say we do not know.

In the main, China is loath to use arms and would allow the tribute and withdraw the troops and so put an end to the calamity of the people; while for our country, our great grudge is unavenged and our force of arms is few and weak, so that we would borrow another's troops to avenge it. Such is the difficulty of the place we stand in. If in the dragging and the putting off the rations are spent and the troops and the people scatter, then though there be an opening to be ridden and commanders to fight with all their strength and swift and sturdy troops, all will be of no use. The urgency of the state of things grows by the day, which is most painful and pressing.