Letter to the Inspector and Army Commander of Pyeongan移平安道巡察節度使文
本道四年調發轉輸之餘民力殫竭糧儲匱乏軍卒寡弱當此之時又有西邊警報雖事變遲速不可預料而其爲可虞則甚矣。朝廷指授雖多而臨機䇿應專在於巡察使及節度使之手不可一一遙制於千里之外姑擧其大勢而言之則江邊一帶蕩然空虛虜若多率醜類乘虛突至則以疲殘軍卒分兵把守數百里間勢不相及若欲角力於平野無依之處則我軍心膽光怯衆寡不敵勝敗之形未可預期必須先察地形險夷防備緊歇有城子之處則合小堡之軍協力固守且多備軍火器械鳥銃勝字各樣火炮以挫其飄忽動盪之勢雖無城池而若賊所必由之處則亦當據險先爲不可勝之勢以待而又於林木山谷之間多設疑兵皷角相應旗幟紛然使賊不測多少可以制勝古語云羗易以計破難用兵碎此乃兵家妙訣爲將者不可不十分體念沿江一帶自江界至義州總爲六鎭渭原以上則以虞候爲助防之任碧潼以下則以碧潼郡守兼助防而兵使以主將總爲節制。朝廷指授實非偶然但聞江邊諸郡自變生以後軍糧甚少當計食而聚軍不可有軍而無食內地之軍別擇丁壯分守各處又以晴川以北炮殺手多數添肪固不可已所慮者糧餉不足軍聚而無可食之物。朝廷所慮惟在於此此等辭緣本道十分詳審及時措置無使臨急而有不及之悔江邊以南之邑如朔州龜城泰川雲山等地守令亦令鱗次整兵預爲約束聞變馳援而內地之軍亦須一樣約束次第遮遏謀慮先定部分詳明則軍心不搖而緩急可以得力幷詳審擧行各道鎭管其數不過四五而本道則有六鎭管平壤所屬有七寧邊所屬有四安州所屬有四義州所屬有二成川所屬有十龜城所屬有二當初分屬多寡之數皆有深意實非偶然盖以前朝以來西方之變或發於水上或發於水下或一時齊發不一其處故一道之兵隨其便近使各自分屬平時則鎭管守令依法操鍊有事則各率其屬聽主將號令或馳援戰所或把截要害賊雖得志於一二處而內地之軍犬牙錯峙輔車相依使不得深入經遠之慮無以加矣近日本道軍兵已經訓鍊炮手之技頗爲可觀苟使主將先定謀䇿靜鎭不搖而䇿應得宜則可無僨事之患其他小小臨機處置事則本道十分詳審處置俾無蹉跌道內軍兵之數各鎭管所屬及哨官旗隊總幷成册上送以憑後考安州形勢甚好且當晴川之路若成重地而與寧邊作爲唇齒則一道形勢自固但城面闊遠難於守備。朝廷欲移撒城之東面進築於鄕校後峯司倉墻外而當此民力困極之時似難更爲此役若以三浦水軍入番者除番築之一朔之番减其日數使二十日築城而去則民情亦似便之今此氷凍時月雖不能輕擧而預爲商度知其闊狹計其人功多少明春始築亦爲無妨幷爲叅商牒報
This province, after four years of raising troops and hauling supplies, has the people's strength spent, its army provisions short, and its soldiers few and weak. At such a time there is besides an alarm on the western frontier; and though whether the trouble come slow or swift cannot be reckoned beforehand, what is to be feared in it is grave. The court's directions are many, but to meet the moment as it comes rests wholly in the hands of the Patrol Commissioner (巡察使) and the Provincial Military Commander (節度使); it cannot be governed from a thousand ri away point by point and at a distance.
To speak for now of the great shape of it: the whole stretch along the river stands empty, and if the barbarians should lead a great host and take the empty gap and come upon us suddenly, then with worn and remaining soldiers divided to hold a span of several hundred ri the parts cannot reach one another. And if we should try to match strength on open ground with nothing to lean upon, our soldiers' hearts would take fright first, and the many and the few being no match, the shape of victory and defeat could not be fixed beforehand.
We must first look to whether the ground is steep or level and whether the defense there is vital or slack: where there are walls, join the troops of the small forts, put their strength together, and hold fast; and furnish besides a plenty of fire-arms and weapons — matchlocks, the Seungja guns (勝字銃筒), and cannon of every kind — to break the enemy's onset, which drives swift as a whirlwind. Even where there are no walls and moats, if it be a place the enemy must pass, there too one should take stand on the steep ground, make first a shape that cannot be beaten, and wait; and set out among the woods and mountain valleys a show as though troops were there, with drum and horn answering one another and banners in confusion, so that the enemy cannot reckon whether we are many or few — then he can be beaten. The old saying has it, 「Barbarians are easy to break by stratagem but hard to crush by arms,」 and this is the subtle secret of the masters of war. One who is a commander must needs grave it ten parts deep upon himself.
The stretch along the river, from Ganggye to Uiju, makes six garrisons in all. Above Wiwon the provincial aide-de-camp (虞候) is charged with the duty of assisting the defense; below Byeokdong the magistrate of Byeokdong holds the assisting defense besides his own office; and the Army Commander, as chief commander, has the ordering of them all. The court's direction in this was truly no chance thing. Only, it is heard that the several counties along the river have had very little army provisions since the trouble broke out; so troops should be gathered by the measure of what there is to eat, and it must not be that there are troops and nothing to eat. Let the troops of the interior be picked apart as able-bodied men and divided to hold the several places, and let many more gunners and swordsmen from north of the Cheongcheon be added to hold them — this truly cannot be left undone; but what is to be feared is that the army provisions will not suffice and the troops be gathered with nothing to eat. What the court fears lies only here. Let this province look into this matter ten parts closely and dispose of it in good time, that there be no regret of falling short when the need is pressing. The magistrates of the counties south of the riverside as well — of such lands as Sakju, Guseong, Taecheon, and Unsan — are likewise to put their troops in order by turns and make agreement beforehand, so that on hearing of the trouble they hasten to help; and the troops of the interior must be bound by the like agreement, to hold the enemy off by turns. If the plan and the care be fixed beforehand and the posts clearly set out, the soldiers' hearts will not be shaken and strength can be had at the pressing hour; look closely into this as well and carry it out.
The garrison commands of the several provinces number no more than four or five, but this province has six. Seven belong to Pyeongyang, four to Yeongbyeon, four to Anju, two to Uiju, ten to Seongcheon, and two to Guseong. The numbers, many or few, by which they were divided and attached at the first all have a deep intent and are truly no chance thing. In general, ever since the former dynasty the troubles in the west have arisen now above the water, now below the water, and now in both places at once, and their place has not been uniform; and so the troops of the one province were each divided and attached according to what was convenient and near, that in ordinary times the magistrate of the garrison command should drill them by the law, and when there was business each should lead the troops belonging to him and, hearing the chief commander's command, now hasten to help on the field of battle and now block and cut off the vital passes. Though the enemy get his will in one place or two, the troops of the interior were made to interlock like a dog's teeth and to lean upon one another like the cart and its outrigger, so that he should not come deep in. To such far-seeing care nothing can be added.
Of late the soldiery of this province has already passed through training and the skill of the gunners is well worth seeing; so truly, if the chief commander fix his plan first, hold still and quiet and unshaken, and meet things with what is fitting, there will be no fear of spoiling the business. For the rest, the small matters to be disposed of as the moment comes, let this province look into ten parts closely and dispose of them so that nothing goes amiss. Make a register of the number of the soldiery within the province, of what belongs to each garrison command, and of the company officers and the banner chiefs and squad chiefs, and send it up, to be the ground of reference hereafter.
Anju is very well placed, and it stands besides at the pass of the Cheongcheon; so if it be made a place of weight and become as lip and tooth with Yeongbyeon, the shape of the whole province will be firm of itself. Only, the wall's circuit is wide and far and hard to hold. The court would pull down the eastern face of the wall and shift it, building out beyond the fence of the public granary on the ridge behind the local school; but at this time when the people's strength is utterly worn it seems hard to take up such labor again. If those who serve their turn among the naval troops of the three harbors were set to build it with a remission of their turn — the days being cut from a month's turn so that they build the wall twenty days and go — the people's feeling too would seem to find it easy. Now in the season when the ice forms it cannot be lightly begun; but there is no harm in reckoning beforehand to know how wide and how narrow it is and to count how much manpower it needs, and beginning to build next spring; reckon this as well and report.